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THE ORGANIZED MUSICIANS: II*
VERN COUNTRYUANf
MECHANICAL COMPETITION
IE many other unions, the AFM has long battled the threat of
technological unemployment. Like their brother-unionists, the
musicians have found that the man who has been displaced by a
machine can take little comfort from the orthodox economist's"'= assur-
ance that the long-run effect of all technological change must be the crea-
tion of a better life in which his remote descendants may share.' Conse-
quently, they have resisted this change as best they could.
This problem can best be understood if one significant characteristic
of the machine in the field of music be noted at the outset. In whatever
form, the machine has never eliminated or even altered the musician's
function. The machine does not make music-it merely provides a means
of preserving and giving wider dissemination to the music made by the
musician. That characteristic is significant in two respects. In the first
place, by providing a means of reproducing musical performances and
making wider dissemination of those performances possible, the machine
has created a greater demand for music and probably inspired a greater
number of people to become musicians without creating a correspondingly
greater demand for the services of musicians.12 Secondly, the machine is
* This is the second and final instalment of The Organized Musicians. Part I appears in
i6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 56 (1948).
t Assistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
12 See Douglas and Director, The Problem of Unemployment, c. x (193A), for a typical
presentation of the argument, completely a priori, that the labor-displacing effects of techno-
logical development will ultimately be balanced by such compensating factors as reduction of
prices and development of new industries. A more realistic study reaches this conclusion:
"Today, a state of unbalance exists, and it seems likely that under present conditions un-
balance will continue and perhaps become even more pronounced." Anderson, Lorwin, and
Blair, Technology in Our Economy 220 (U.S. TNEC Monograph 22, 1941).
The attitude of the displaced worker was well expressed by Philip Murray a few years
ago: "Classical economic pronouncements about the automatic absorption of displaced workers
by private industry, whether true in the long run or not, are just so much dribble to the men
and women who are deprived of their accustomed way of making a livelihood.... As a famous
economist once said, in the long run we are all dead." Hearings before TNEC pursuant to
Pub. Res. 113, 7 6th Cong. 3 d Sess., at z6,505 (1940).
23 While no precise measurement of these effects has been made, available information
indicates the tendency. Thus, federal census figures disclose that while the total population
of the United States was increasing by some 43%, the number of gainfully employed musicians
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still dependent on the musician for the original performance-a fact which
has at once served to dramatize the musician's plight and to aid him in
his struggle against mechanization.
In its original manifestations, the machine constituted no threat to
employment opportunities. In 1896 the National Gramaphone Company,
by introducing a superior recording process and replacing the cylinder-
type record with a flat disc, stimulated its only rivals, Edison and the
American Graphaphone Company (later Columbia Graphaphone Com-
pany) ' 24 into activity which converted the phonograph from a scientific
novelty heard through earphones in barrooms, bawdy houses, and penny
arcades to a horn-equipped instrument which could be enjoyed simul-
taneously by the entire family. But this development did not mean new
competition for the musician. Indeed, the phonograph opened an entirely
new labor market for him. For by recording his performance he put it
into a form which would be purchased for use in the home. And, except
for an occasional engagement to play for private balls, the musician's
employment opportunities had previously been limited to public per-
formances.
The promise of this new market was soon fulfilled. In i9o6 the Victor
Talking Machine Company (i9oi successor of National Gramaphone
Company) converted the phonograph into a thing of beauty by reversing
the horn and enclosing it in the cabinet of the Victrola. With the aid of a
best-selling line featuring Enrico Caruso, Victor launched a recording
and music teachers, vocal and instrumental, decreased from igro (i3g,3oo) to 1940 (129,256)
by 7%. Thirteenth Census of The United States, vol. iv, at 54 (19IO); Sixteenth Census of
The United States, vol. iii, part i, at 8i, 83 (i94o). Since the census counts only the occu-
pation in which the individual makes most of his income (igio Census) or to which he devotes
most of his time (194o Census), it gives no indication of the number of persons for whom
music is a secondary vocation. Subject to distortions due to the facts that such persons were
not completely unionized in the early years, that union rolls include some who no longer fol-
low the profession at all, and that the AFM membership roll includes Canadian and dupli-
cate memberships, some indication of the increase in the total number of persons seeking pro-
fessional engagements as instrumental musicians may be secured from union membership
figures. These figures reveal that the AFM's total membership in 1940 (135,ooo) represented
a 77% increase, and in 1948 (232,000) a 200% increase, over the total claims of all unions
representing instrumental performers in i9o9 (76,000).
-4 As is not infrequently the case, the structure of the industry was governed by the
ownership of patents. Edison's patent of 1878 covered a system of recording sound by means
of indentations on a tinfoil-covered cylinder. American Graphaphone Company operated
under Bell & Taintor's x886 patent on a process for cutting grooves in a wax-like cylinder.
National Gramaphone Company was built upon a patent issued to Emil Berliner in 1895
which substituted a flat-groove record for the hill-and-dale variety used by Edison and
American; see Victor Talking Machine Co. v. American Graphaphone Co., 14o Fed. 86o
(D.C. N.Y., i9o5). With the expiration of these basic patents, a number of new companies,
the most successful of which was the Brunswick Record Corporation, were able to enter the
field.
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boom that was to last fifteen years."5- The musicians, who could now
supplement their earnings from public performances with the income from
recording engagements, had no reason to combat the phonograph.
True, there was one instance of mechanical competition during this
time. Player-pianos and "automatic" phonographs were being used to
provide accompanying music in the theaters for another new develop-
ment-the motion pictureX2 To meet this threat, the AFM's 1912 con-
vention authorized the Locals to demand that their members be employed
to operate "any mechanical instrument which replaces all or part of an
orchestra. ' '"2 7 The Locals, invoking a variety of arguments,"52 a boycott
of the Rudolph Wurlitzer Company (which manufactures musical sup-
plies and instruments in addition to mechanical pianos and automatic
phonographs), and the support of other unions,121 proceeded to enforce
the national policy. With substantial assistance from the stagehands'
union, which had extended its jurisdiction to include motion picture pro-
jectionists in 19o8, the Locals did so well that by 1916 the AFM ex-
panded its demands to require that "the introduction of a music machine
shall not interfere with the minimum number of men rule of the Local."'' 03
Within a few years thereafter the Locals had succeeded in placing union
musicians, in numbers varying from a single pianist or organist to a full
orchestra, in practically every movie theater in the country.
This result was achieved without any recorded instance of litigation on
the merits of the Federation's campaign against mechanical competition.
- For accounts of the early history of the phonograph industry, see Taubman, i65,ooo
Discs a Year, New York Times Magazine 20 (Dec. 8, 1946); Phonograph Records, 2o For-
tune, No. 3, at 72 (1939); Maraniss, A Dog Has Nine Lives: The Story of the Phonograph, 193
Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. Sci. 8 (i937); Yorke, The Rise and Fall of the Phonograph, 27 Amer.
Mercury i (1932); Expiration of the Berliner Talking Machine Patent, 1o6 Scientific American
52 (1912).
2 The birth of the motion picture dates from Edison's demonstration of his kinetoscope in
x899. Mechanical pianos were introduced at least as early as i8go; the automatic phono-
graph came fifteen years later. Neither proved an outstanding success as a coin-operated
machine, perhaps in part because the customer had no choice in selecting the number to be
played. Letter from E. L. Hahne, treasurer of the Wurlitzer Company, Jan. 2Q, i948. But
both were employed by early motion picture exhibitors.
27 International Musician io (Supp., June 1912).
-8 Including the contention that all theaters should be required to hire orchestras because
of the traditional panic-quelling effects of music in event of fire. International Musician 8
(Aug. 1914); ibid., at 9 (Oct. '9i5).
19 The 1915 convention of the AFL adopted a resolution, introduced by AFM delegates,
directing all AFL unions to "extend every possible assistance to the American Federation of
Musicians in enforcing their demands on the employers of music where machines are placed."
Proceedings of Thirty-fifth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor i97,
295 (19IS).
13O AFM By-Laws Art. IX, § 19 (I947).
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That question was first judicially examined at a much later day (but in
a similar setting) when the AFM invoked the assistance of the stage-
hands to prevent a traveling opera company from using phonograph rec-
ords to supply the orchestral accompaniment for its performances. In
that case, the New York Court of Appeals approved the issuance of an
injunction, taking the occasion to announce the doctrine, which it later
was to apply against the AFM again"3' that any labor activity taken to
achieve an objective which the court by some sort of intuitive inspiration
should determine to be "unlawful" was both enjoinable at common law
and outside the coverage of New York's "little Norris-LaGuardia Act.""'
'
By the time the machine had been ousted from the motion picture thea-
ter, it was beginning to appear in a new form. The radio, previously em-
ployed only as a signaling device, was successfully used for voice broad-
casting in 192o, and thus was introduced a new industry which today
operates more than 1,472 standard (AM) broadcasting stations. 3' Almost
immediately this industry was faced with the problem which it has not
yet solved-what to use for program material. Recorded music offered
one answer, and the broadcasters embraced it so enthusiastically that the
radio station became little more than an extension of the phonograph.
This development disturbed the Department of Commerce, which was
attempting to regulate the industry by a system of licensing under the
rather dubious authority of the Radio Act of 1912.34 As the Department
described the situation later:
During the early days the programs of a majority of the stations consisted almost
entirely of phonograph records. The announcers usually had favorite records which
they repeated numerous times during a program. The Secretary of Commerce foresaw
the danger of stations losing public interest if a change was not made in the programs."35
The Secretary sought to effect that change in 1922 by opening a new
wave length to private broadcasters who would meet certain prescribed
standards. Previously, all private broadcasting had been restricted to a
frequency of 833 kilocycles, thus limiting each community to a maximum
of one full-time station. By his new regulations, Secretary Hoover created
,3a American Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E. 2d 123 (194i), dis-
cussed in text at note 67 supra.
X132 Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E. 2d 349 ('94'), motion to amend
remittitur denied 286 N.Y. 565, 35 N.E. 2d 920 (1941), cert. den. 314 U.S. 615 (x941), re-
hearing den. 314 U.S. 7x6 (1942). The Court of Appeals had begun to lay the groundwork for
this emasculation of the New York anti-injunction statute five years earlier; see The Decline
of the New York Court of Appeals, 8 Int. Jurid. Ass'n Bull. 29 (1939).
'33 Hearings, op. cit. supra note gi, at 263.
134 37 Stat. 302 (1912).
n SAnnual Report, Chief of Radio Division, Department of Commerce 8 (1929).
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a new Class B license to operate on 750 kilocycles, one of the conditions
of the license being that mechanically operated musical instruments could
not be used.31 That restriction upon the holders of Class B licenses and
the competition of such licensees with the holders of nonrestrictive
licenses combined for a time to prevent excessive use of phonograph rec-
ords on the air.
But even when not used in conjunction with the phonograph, the radio
was not an unmixed blessing for the musician. True, by carrying music
into the home it was helping to cultivate in each community the new
market which the phonograph had opened. 37 But the radio-stimulated
demand did not result in benefit to the musicians in each community, be-
cause the broadcasters soon introduced a new development.
The American Telephone and Telegraph Company inaugurated net-
work broadcasting in 1923 when a program was broadcast simultaneously
from its station WEAF (now WNBC) in New York and station WNAC
in Boston by-means of a connecting telephone line. 35 By the end of 1925
the A.T.&T. network served a chain of 26 stations, and the Radio Corpo-
ration of America had formed another chain based on its station WJZ in
New York. From this beginning has grown a system of four nation-wide
chains'39-NBC, CBS, MBS, and ABC-and forty-five regional net-
136 The original regulation provided that "mechanically operated musical instruments may
be used only in an emergency and during intermission periods in regular programs." Bureau
of Navigation, Radio Service Bulletin No. 65, at ii (Sept. 1, 1922). One month later the
regulation was amended to prohibit mechanical music entirely. Ibid., No. 66, at 8 (Oct. 2,
1922).
137 During the early years of broadcasting the musicians, like all other performing artists,
aided the cultivation of this new market by donating their services. Jome, The Economics of
the Radio Industry 176 (1925).
138 FCC, Report on Chain Broadcasting 6 (194i), hereafter cited as FCC Chain Report.
139 The National Broadcasting Company was formed by RCA, General Electric Company,
and Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company in 1926 to take over the operation of
the WEAF and WJZ chains, which it operated as the "Red" and "Blue" Networks. In 193o
RCA acquired full ownership of NBC. In 1933, as the result of an anti-trust consent decree,
General Electric and Westinghouse disposed of their substantial stock interests in RCA;
see United States v. Radio Corporation of America, 3 F. Supp. 23 (Del., 1933); FCC Chain
Report 7-8.
United Independent Broadcasters, Inc., was formed in 1927 by impresario Arthur Judson,
three associates, and the Columbia Phonograph Company. The Phonograph Company sold
its interest after a few months, and in 1928 the William S. Paley family acquired the controlling
interest which it still holds. In 1929 the name of the company was changed to Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. FCC Chain Report 21.
Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc., was formed in 1934 by a group of radio station opera-
tors, and is controlled by the Chicago Tribune's station WGN and R. H. Macy Company's
station WOR. FCC Chain Report 26-28.
As a result of its investigation of chain broadcasting, the FCC required NBC to dispose of
one of its two networks. NBC elected to dispose of the "Blue" (WJZ) system, which wassetup
as a separate corporation in 1942 and sold in 1943 to Edward J. Noble, the candy Life-Saver
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works40 through which a single program can be broadcast simultaneously
in more than 450 different communities.'1'
Thus, although radio originally carried greater promise than the phono-
graph for the instrumental musician-because it provided a means for
him to reach the family home with his performance without putting that
performance in such form that it could be repeated mechanically-much
of what radio offered it soon took away with the development of chain
broadcasting. Although the AFM is acutely aware of the restrictive effect
of the network device upon the employment opportunities of its members,
it has not yet devised a strategy to combat that effect. After the networks
had made a new bid for local patronage by introducing the" co-op show"'r42
-- a network program with cued blanks for the insertion of local adver-
tisers' blurbs-the Federation in September 1940 ordered its members
not to participate in such shows. But that ban was lifted in December
1947 (perhaps because the producer of "Information Please" had filed un-
fair labor practice charges under the Taft-Hartley Act43); and new three-
year contracts concluded between the network originating stations and
AFM Locals in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles in March 1948 ex-
pressly provide that musicians will perform on co-op programs. 44
Meanwhile, the years which witnessed early developments in network
broadcasting were marked by two other events which drastically affected
the employment opportunities of musicians. One of these was the intro-
duction of sound movies. Within a short time after Warner Brothers
released "The jazz Singer" in 1927, most of the motion picture theaters
in the United States were equipped for sound, and i8,ooo AFM members
formerly employed to provide music for vaudeville and for silent films
were out of work. 4 This sudden development caught the Federation com-
king; see Radio Corporation of America, io FCC 2X2 (1943). In 1945 the name of the system
was changed to American Broadcasting Company.
140 Broadcasting Yearbook 334 (i948).
X41 As of January 1948 the four national networks had 1o67 affiliates-ABC had 260, CBS
had 164, MBS had 476, and NBC had 167. While most of these stations are affiliated with the
networks only through contractual arrangements, ABC owns 5 stations, CBS owns 7, and NBC
owns 6. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 91, at 258, 271, 280, 283.
14, MBS introduced the co-op show in 1937. The four national networks now offer about
fifty such shows. Newsweek 68 (Oct. 20, 1947).
143 On the theory that the AFM ban on such programs constituted an illegal boycott undee
§ 8(b)(4) of the Act. 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. 17 (1947).
144 Variety, p. 38 (Mar. 24, 1948).
X4SMermey, The. Vanishing Fiddler, 227 No. Amer. Rev. 3oi (1929); Hearings, op. cit.
supra note 9x, at 336, 405.
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pletely unprepared. In 1927 President Weber had assured the membership
that "a general danger to employment will not develop, as from present
observation it appears that the public accepts the Vitaphone merely as
a novelty.' ' 46 When this prediction proved wrong, he essayed another:
"It is the opinion of the Federation leadership, based upon exhaustive
study, that mechanical music... will fail eventually to give satisfaction
in any theater as a substitute for the appearance of artists in person."'' 47
And to accelerate public dissatisfaction with mechanical sound he per-
suaded the 1929 convention to authorize a nation-wide advertising cam-
paign to expose the sound movie as an "anti-cultural development.' ' 4
Although the Federation's advertisements featuring robot musicians
won commendation from experts, 49 the sound movie continued to thrive.
And by the time it had become apparent that propaganda would not win
the battle, the AFM was in a poor position to resort to anything else. A
musicians' strike could not be called in the theaters-men must be em-
ployed before they can strike. While the supply of mechanical music could
have been stopped at its source by calling a strike in the studios where
sound pictures were made, the Supreme Court had held similar boycotts
by the machinists' and stonecutters' unions enjoinable under the Sherman
Act by limiting the union-exempting provisions of the Clayton Act to dis-
putes between the striking employees and the struck employer,,5" and
the Federation was unwilling to risk a federal injunction. 51 When the
stagehands, already preoccupied with the problem of extending their
jurisdiction over projection machines to include sound equipment, refused
to call their members out of the theaters under the 1913 AFM-IASTE
agreement, the AFM was without any effective means of combating the
new mechanical competition.
Of course, while the advent of sound movies meant unemployment for
many musicians throughout the country, it also meant that there would
x46 International Musician 23 (Oct. 1927).
147 Ibid., at i (Feb. 1929).
149 Ibid., at 18 (May 1929); ibid., at i (June 1929). And see Slichter, Union Policies and
Industrial Management 211-13 (1941).
X49 "We have seen no more striking or convincing copy in any advertisement ..... " Edi-
tor & Publisher 54 (Oct. 26, 1929).
'so Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927). The boycotts involved in these cases
were at the opposite end of the distribution process-the machinists and the stonecutters re-
fused to work on printing presses and cut stone purchased from non-union producers-but the
rationale of the Duplex and Bedford decisions would be equally applicable to a strike against
a producer who sold his product to non-union customers.
'15 International Musician 10, 14 (June i93o).
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be some augmentation of the 2oo-odd musicians employed by the produc-
ing studios to supply "mood music" for the inspiration of the actors. And
on this relatively minor phase of the matter, the AFM was in a better
position to represent its members. A few years earlier it had come to the
aid of the stagehands, carpenters, electricians, and painters in their cam-
paign to unionize the studios. It had also joined with them in the 1926
Studio Basic Agreement with the major producers, the chief feature of
which is to provide for negotiation of studio contracts at an annual New
York meeting between officers of the unions and representatives of the
producers.- 2 Through its negotiations at the national level under this
agreement, the Federation has been able to initiate the quota system
previously mentioned under which about 5oo musicians are emjloyed at
annual salaries of not less than $6,90' s3 to provide the music for pictures
which play in more than i8,ooo theaters with an aggregate weekly at-
tendance exceeding 6o,ooo,ooo.' 54 And since 1938 it has sought to protect
these musicians by requiring the producers to agree that sound tracks
will be used only" to accompany the picture for which the music was per-
formed" and will not be" disposed of, sold, leased, or used for any picture
or purpose except to accompany a revival of the picture for which record-
ings were originally made."' 5
When the development of television suggested a new method for the
use of sound films, additional provisions were inserted in the studio con-
tracts to forbid the use of musical sound track for television broadcast
without prior consent of the Federation.16 Those provisions were included
in two-year contracts negotiated in 1946 in the face of a Supreme Court
decision which casts considerable doubt on their validity. Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEWS5 found a violation of the Sherman Act
in contracts entered into by the New York local of the electrical workers'
union in order to create more employment opportunities for its members.
The local had secured contracts with all electrical contractors in the New
York City area providing that the contractors should recognize the closed
shop and should purchase equipment from none but New York manufac-
turers who employed members of the local. Similar closed shop contracts
had been made with the manufacturers, who agreed to confine their New
- Ross, Stars and Strikes 13-21 (I940.
'53 See text at note 97 supra.
XS4 Variety, p. 9 (Apr. 28, 1948); Lindey, Motion Picture Agreements Annotated vii ('947).
m2 Ross, op. cit. supra note 152, at 2o6; Hearings, op. cit. supra note 68, at 5o6.
156 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 68, at 199, 207, 232.
1-7 325 U.S. 797 (i945).
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York City sales to contractors employing the local's members. The effect
of these arrangements was not only to create more employment for the
electricians but also to give the employers a monopoly on the sale and
installation of electrical equipment in the New York City area. The Court
found nothing in the Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Acts or in its prior
decisions construing those acts which would exempt the union's "combi-
nation with business groups" from the prohibition of the anti-trust laws.
Apparently the agreements involved in that case constituted illegal com-
binations with business groups, as distinguished from legal collective bar-
gaining agreements between union and employer, because they served
to aid not only the union members in their competition for jobs but also
the employers in their competition for markets. At least that seems to be
the meaning of the explanation offered by the Court:
Section 6 of the Clayton Act declares that the Sherman Act must not be so con-
strued as to forbid the "existence and operation of labor, agricultural and horticultural
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help.. . ." But "the purpose of
mutual help" can hardly be thought to cover activities for the purpose of "employer-
help" in controlling markets and prices....
Since union members can without violating the Sherman Act strike to enforce a
union boycott of goods, it is said they may settle the strike by getting their employers
to refuse to buy the goods. Employers and the union did here make bargaining agree-
ments in which the employers agreed not to buy goods manufactured by companies
which did not employ the members of Local No. 3. We may assume that such an agree-
ment standing alone would not have violated the Sherman Act. But it did not stand
alone. It was but one element in a far larger program in which contractors and manu-
facturers united with one another to monopolize all the business in New York City,
to bar all other businessmen from that area, and to charge the public prices above a
competitive level. It is true that victory of the union in its disputes, even had the union
acted alone, might have added to the cost of goods, or might have resulted in individual
refusals of all of their employers to buy electrical equipment not made by Local No. 3.
So far as the union might have achieved this result acting alone, it would have been the
natural consequence of labor union activities exempted by the Clayton Act from the
coverage of the Sherman Act .... But when the union participated with a combina-
tion of businessmen who had complete power to eliminate all competition among them-
selves and to prevent all competition from others, a situation was created not included
within the exemptions 9f the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.ss
If a labor agreement is legal or illegal depending upon whether the em-
ployer was compelled to enter into it by economic pressure from the union
or was induced to enter into it because of the competitive advantages it
offered him, a contract with the motion picture producers which restricts
the supply of program material available for television broadcasting is
certainly suspect. But it seems doubtful that the studio contracts will be
S Ibid., at 80g.
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tested under the Allen Bradley doctrine. Although great surprise was ex-
pressed in trade circles when the anti-television agreements were dis-
closed in congressional hearings last year,5 9 their existence was a matter
of public knowledge at the time the studio contracts were signed.16° In
addition, the major producers agreed with the AFM in August 1948
to renew the 1946 agreements for another year.,6' Yet neither the De-
partment of Justice nor the television broadcasters have moved to
invoke the anti-trust laws. So far, then, the AFM has been successful in
its attempt to prevent further encroachment by sound motion pictures
upon the musicians' employment opportunities. 62
Not as graphic as the introduction of sound pictures, but of serious con-
sequence to the musicians nonetheless, was the return of phonograph rec-
ords to the radio. After two adverse decisions in the lower federal courts' 63
and an opinion from the Attorney General advising that the Radio Act
of 1912 gave him no authority to fix the wave length, time, or power at
which a private broadcasting station might operate, 6 4 the Secretary of
Commerce in 1926 abandoned all attempts to regulate private radio broad-
casting.
The Federal Radio Commission, created in 1927 to take over that regu-
latory function, was unwilling to forbid the use of phonograph records as
the Secretary had done, although it did not disagree entirely with his
conclusions as to the desirability of such use. In view of its analysis of the
matter, the Commission's position was rather indecisive:
By its General Order No. i6, issued on August 9, 1927, the commission, while not
condemning the practice of using mechanical reproductions such as phonograph rec-
ords or perforated rolls, required that all broadcasting of this nature be dearly de-
scribed in the announcement of each number. The commission has felt, and still feels,
that to permit such broadcasting without appropriate announcement is, in effect, a
fraud upon the public. It is true that in the smaller communities which do not have
adequate original program resources, the use of phonograph records may fill a need;
it is true also that there may be developments in specially produced records which
can be made use of to advantage by radio. On the whole, however, the commission is
"59 Variety, pp. 1, 55 (July 2, 1947); ibid., p. 69 (July 9, 1947)-
16o See New York Times, p. i (Apr. 1o, 1946); ibid., p. 30 (Apr. Ii, 1946); ibid., p. i (Apr.
27, ,946).
"'t Variety, p. i8 (Sept. i, 1948). The new contracts expire August 31, 1949.
12 But foreign competition is appearing in a new form. The New York Daily News's new
television station WPIX and the Chicago Tribune's WGN have arranged to televise a block of
English films. 51 Time, No. 45, at 85 (May 1o, 1948); ibid., No. 47, at 73 (May 24, 1948).
163 Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 Fed. oo3 (App. D.C., 1923); United States v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 12 F. 2d 614 (D.C. Ill., 1926).
z64 35 Ops. Att'y Gen. 126 (1926).
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inclined to believe that the use of ordinary commercial records in a city with ample
original program resources is an unnecessary duplication of service otherwise available
to the public, and the crowded channels should not be wasted in this manner. General
Order No. 49, issued on October 26, 1928, makes more rigid requirements as to an-
nouncements of mechanical reproductions 6s
The Radio Commission never advanced beyond this point in its regulation
of the use of records. And the Federal Communications Commission,
which succeeded it in 1934, has done no more than to make refinements
upon the old policy. 6
6
Extensive use of recorded music by radio stations did not follow imme-
diately after the lifting of the government proscription because of the
waning popularity of such music. Introduction of radio broadcasting at
first appeared to mean the end of the phonograph industry. After the 1921
high of ioo,ooo,ooo records, sales had declined. Although Victor's intro-
duction of an improved recording process under license from the Western
Electric Company and Brunswick's development of the electric phono-
graph had caused a brief spurt of record sales to the 65,000,000 level in
1929, sales had dropped to io,ooo,ooo by 1932.,67
At this low point, a number of events conspired to bring new life to
the recording business. Swing music was introduced and it swept the
country like wildfire. Soon after the Twenty-first Amendment reopened
the tavern and the cabaret, the automatic phonograph supplied each of
them with a "multi-selective" juke box. Decca Records Company Ltd.
created an American subsidiary, Decca Records, Inc., to supply clamoring
swing fans with a thirty-five-cent record x6 Consolidated Film Industries,
Inc., which had brought Columbia and Brunswick into its American Rec-
ord Company through a failure to anticipate that the film sound track
16s FRC, Annual Report i9 (1928).
166 Current FCC regulations require the broadcaster of mechanical reproductions to
identify them as such at least once for each record, twice if the program exceeds five minutes, or
every 3o minutes if the program exceeds 30 minutes. 13 Fed. Register 422 (1948).
z67 Variety, P. 46 (Mar. 19, 1947); Phonograph Records, 2o Fortune, No. 3, at 72, 74-75
(Sept. 1939); Review of Reviews 99 (Jan. 1926).
z6S tandard & Poor's Corp. Records (C-E) 1451; Business Week 14 (Nov. io, 1934). The
English company disposed of its holdings in American Decca in 1938. Standard & Poor, supra,
at 1450-51. Currently, io per cent of Decca's stock is held by the family of Jack Kapp, presi-
dent of the company. Listing Statements, New York Stock Exchange, vol. i8g, A-1256 7.
Bing Crosby is also a stockholder, but the identity of the remaining owners of the American
company is one of the secrets of the trade. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 91, at 22o. Agreements
by which American Decca, English Decca, and Electrical & Musical Industries, Ltd. have
divided world markets form the basis of an anti-trust complaint ified in the District Court for
the Southern District of New York August 3, 1948.
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would early replace the record in sound movies, diverted a part of its pro-
duction to a twenty-five cent record.'6 9
The swing craze, the juke box, and the cheap record swept the record-
ing industry back to prosperity, 70 and with its returning popularity re-
corded music returned also to the radio. But with the phonograph record
the broadcasters now combined a new type of mechanical reproduction-
the electrical transcription, a development of the Western Electric Com-
pany which made it possible to record a fifteen-minute program on a single
sixteen-inch disc.
The transcription, first licensed for production in 1930,' 7 opened a num-
ber of new possibilities for the use of recorded music which were soon ex-
ploited by the broadcasting industry. As the uses of the transcription came
later to be classified in the jargon of the trade, the most important are: i)
"Tailor made" transcriptions, recording an entire program complete with
sponsor's plugs. Such transcriptions may be made in advance of broadcast
time, or the initial broadcast may be transcribed at the time of perform-
ance for subsequent rebroadcast. 2) "Open end" transcriptions, recording
a complete program with blank spots for later insertion of announcements.
3) "Spot commercials," recording a commercial plug for incessant re-use
in the manner made notorious by the Pepsi-Cola jingle.172 4) "Library"
transcriptions, made without commercial plugs or blanks therefor, for use
on sustaining programs.
So extensive has the use of transcriptions and phonograph records be-
come that when in 1942 the FCC conducted a survey of 796 of the 89o
standard stations then operating, it discovered that while 76 per cent of
the broadcast time of the average station is devoted to programs contain-
ing music, over 55 per cent of those programs used recorded or transcribed
music. Among the stations not affiliated with a network, even greater use
was made of mechanical reproductions-230 of the 298 non-affiliated sta-
169 Phonograph Records, 20 Fortune, No. 3, at 72, oo (Sept. 1939); Hearings before Com-
mittee on Patents on S. 3047, H.R. 1142o, and H.R. 10632, 74 th Cong. 2d Sess., at 626 (1936).
Acquisition of the Brunswick Record Corporation did not include the right to use the Bruns-
wick name on records. That was retained by the Brunswick Radio Corporation and went
with the purchase of the ]atter company from Warner Brothers by American Decca in 1941.
Standard & Poor's Corp. Records (C-E) 1451.
170 See Ulanov, The Jukes Take Over Swing, 51 American Mercury 172 (1940).
17 To Sound Studios of New York, a subsidiary of the World Broadcasting System.
Kendrick, Recorded Radio Programs, x43 Scientific American 304 (1930).
172 An electrical transcription can be played from soo to 2,ooo times-the ordinary phono-
graph record is good for only 1oo to 15o playings. Phonograph Records, 2o Fortune, No. 3,
at 72, 102 (Sept. 1939).
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lions relied on recorded music for over 8o per cent of their musical pro-
grams. 73
Alarm over this widespread resort to mechanical music is not confined
to the musicians. It is shared by at least some of the networks. The small
radio station which otherwise might be driven to a network contract by
the dearth of local talent has in many cases been able to fill out its broad-
casting hours with recorded music. Moreover, the electrical transcription
affords a means for nationwide broadcasting of an entire program without
resort to the networks.' 7 Recognizing the threat of such competition,
NBC in 1934 began gradually to eliminate all recorded programs on the
stations which it operates. CBS soon adopted the same policy, and today
recorded or transcribed shows are not broadcast over either network." s
Such are the paradoxes of modern business practice that NBC felt con-
strained to adopt this policy although its parent, RCA, had purchased the
Victor Talking Machine Company in 9i9176 and had entered the tran-
scription business in 1934, and CBS, despite its similar policy, acquired the
American Record Corporation (now Columbia Record Corporation) in
1938 and entered the transcription field in 1940.
Despite the AFM's growing concern over the extent to which mechani-
cal music was being used, the first action to be taken by musicians with
respect to such use was not taken by the Federation; nor was it a move in-
spired by fear of unemployment. Some of the musicians who make the
records opened a campaign to increase their earnings from recorded per-
formances.
Early in 1934 a Philadelphia lawyer, Maurice J. Speiser, published a
translation of a French text on the legal rights of performing artists.?7 A1-
173 Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Interstate Commerce pursuant to
S. Res. 286, 7 7 th Cong. 2d Sess., at 18-21, 26 (1942). For an example of the extreme extent to
which some of the non-network stations rely upon recorded music, see Cannon System, Ltd.
(KIEV), 8 FCC 207, 208 (i94O).
'74 Keystone Broadcasting System, Inc., formned in 194o to exploit the network-like possi-
bilities of the electrical transcription, now serves 333 stations with two hours of transcribed
sustaining programs per day. Broadcasting 74 (May 24, 1948). And the Frederick W. Ziv
Company has twenty-three open-end transcribed shows which are heard on two-thirds of the
radio stations in the country. Business Week 68-69 (June 2 1, 1947).
17S Both networks make exceptions to this policy during periods of day]ight saving time to
allow the transcribing of complete programs for subsequent rebroadcast by affiliated stations
in different time zones. Last summer both experimented with tape recorders, which seem
destined eventually to replace the electrical transcription. Variety, p. 4o (Mar. 24, x948);
Newsweek 31 (May 3, 1948).
'76 Operated first as RCA Victor Company, Inc., and later as RCA Manufacturing Corpora-
tion, the recording business has been conducted as RCA-Victor Division since 1942. Standard
& Poor's Corporation Records (P-S) 2082.
177 Homburg, Legal Rights of Performing Artists (1934).
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though the American copyright statute had never been construed to ex-
tend to the phonograph record or to the performance recorded on it,"'
Speiser added an "Addendum" to his translation in which he argued that
the courts might be persuaded to recognize a legal interest for the per-
former in the recorded performance under one or more of four theories:
i) The common law afforded the literary artist protection against the un-
authorized publication of his work, and this doctrine might be extended to
cover musical performances. Since the "common law copyright" did not
survive publication, however, Speiser concluded that this theory held
scant promise. 2) In International News Service v. Associated rress179 the
United States Supreme Court had extended the common-law concept of
unfair competition to prohibit a competitor's unauthorized use of uncopy-
righted news collected by the Associated Press, and Speiser thought that a
similar extension should be made to cover a radio station's unauthorized
use of the musician's recorded 1erformance, since the station in selling its
recorded programs to advertisers was competing with the musician who
sought to sell the advertiser live programs. 3) Ever since Warren and
Brandeis had published their treatise on the "right to privacy" in 189 oe8 °
the phrase had been recurring in legal literature, and the concept had
found some judicial support. Although Speiser listed this theory as a pos-
sibility, he concluded that "it is extremely doubtful whether today it is
of any aid to the performer." 4) Under a doctrine of "moral right," con-
tinental jurisprudence affords the artist protection which enables him,
among other things, to prevent use of his work in such manner as to injure
his artistic reputation. 8' Speiser suggested that a similar notion might be
developed at common law to protect the performer against the use of im-
perfect recordings.
Within a few months after publication of this dissertation, the National
Association of Performing Artists was organized, with Fred Waring as
178 Section 4 of the Copyright Act of igog, as amended, provides: "The works for which
copyrightability may be secured under this Act shall include all the writings of an author."
17 U.S.C.A. § 4 (Supp., i947). Section 5 lists thirteen categories of copyrightable works, in-
cluding photographs and motion pictures, but makes no reference to phonograph records.
Although Section 5 concludes with a proviso that "the above specifications shall not be held
to limit the subject matter of copyright as defined in section 4," 17 U.S.C.A. § 5 (Supp., 1947),
the Copyright Office is probably correct in concluding that the statute was not intended to
confer a copyright upon either the recorder or the performer. See Chafee, Reflections on the
Law of Copyright, 45 Col. L. Rev. 719, 734-735 ('945).
179 248 U.S. 215 (i9x8).
180 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (i8go).
18. See Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554 (1940).
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president and Maurice J. Speiser as general counsel, and with member-
ship open to any "actor, singer, conductor, instrumentalist, lecturer, and
any other interpretative artist or performer."'IS2 This organization now
claims over 8oo members, including such AFM members as Paul White-
man, Eddie Duchin, Jascha Heifetz, Andre Kostelanetz, Ray Noble,
Arturo Toscanini, and Guy Lombardo, and such non-instrumental musi-
cians as Al Jolson, Bing Crosby, Richard Crooks, and Lawrence Tibbett.'83
Soon after its formation, NAPA set out to test Speiser's legal theories,
selecting a Pennsylvania court for its forum and offering the following evi-
dence for its case: In 1932 Fred Waring and his incorporated orchestra (in
which Waring owned all but two qualifying shares of stock) recorded for
Victor two currently popular songs, receiving $250 for each recording.
Anticipating that these records might be used for radio broadcast, Waring
stipulated with Victor that they should be labeled: "Not licensed for radio
broadcast."'1 4 After the records were made they were sold by Victor to its
dealers, and by the latter to individual purchasers at a retail price of sev-
enty-five cents each. Radio station WDAS purchased such records and in
July 1935, after making the identifying announcements required by FCC
regulations, broadcast them on a sustaining program.58 At the time of this
broadcast, Waring's orchestra was under exclusive radio contract to the
Ford Motor Company at $13,5oo per week.
On this showing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Waring v. WDAS
Broadcasting Station, Inc."' affirmed a trial court order granting an in-
junction against unauthorized use of the Waring records. Its decision,
rendered in a flush of pioneering zeal, 87 drew support from all of Speiser's
z8 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 169, at 675.
193 Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 1269, H.R. 1270,
and H.R. 2570, 8oth Cong. ist Sess., at 8, 209 (1947). A similar organization, the American
Society of Recordings Artists, was incorporated in California in 1934 with Al Jolson as Presi-
dent. NAB Reports 1495 (Sept. 1, 1936). Three years later it was merged with the Waring
organization. Letter from Maurice J. Speiser, Dec. i6, i947.
194 Victor's recording license from the publisher of the songs also required Victor to place
such a legend on the label. The composer's copyright includes the power to require separate
licenses for publication, recording, and public performance for profit. x7 U.S.C.A. § i (Supp.,
1947). Usual trade practice is for the composer to assign both the publishing and the recording
rights to a music publisher and to assign the performance rights either to the American So-
ciety of Composers, Authors and Publishers formed in 1914 for that purpose, or to Broadcast
Music, Inc., an organization formed by the broadcasting industry in 1939 during its battle
with ASCAP over royalty rates for performance rights.
iss WDAS had secured a performing license from ASCAP, since radio broadcasting is con-
sidered public performance for profit. Witmark v. Bamberger, 291 Fed. 776 (D.C. N.J.,
1923), and cases cited in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 1g (1931).
'86 327 Pa. 433, 194 AtI. 631 (1937).
187 "The problems involved in this case have never before been presented to an American
or an English court .... Sound can now be mechanically captured and reproduced, not only
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theories and embraced Professor Chafee's notion of equitable servitudes on
chattels as well.' A majority of the court thought that the musical per-
formers' interpretation of the composer's work, at least where the perform-
ers were Waring's orchestra, constituted "such novel and artistic crea-
tion" as to "elevate interpretation to the realm of independent works of
art" entitled to the protection of common-law copyright. Although this
interpretation was the work of a number of musicians, no problem arose in
allowing Waring alone to invoke protection for it, since he owned the cor-
poration by which the musicians were employed. With the question
whether the placing of that interpretation on records for general public
sale constituted a "publication" which the common-law copyright would
not survive, s9 the court had more difficulty. It observed, accurately
enough, that a distinction is taken between a"limited" publication, which
does not affect the copyright, and a "general" publication, which ter-
minates it.190 Then, disregarding the point that this distinction turns upon
the extent to which the work has been made available to the public, rather
than upon the form of its dissemination,'9x and brushing aside as "com-
paratively early" those cases which had held restrictions on the use to be
made of the work by its purchasers ineffective to save the common-law
right,1 92 the court concluded that, in view of the restrictive label on the
Waring records, there had been no "general" publication.
by means of the phonograph for an audience physically present, but, through broadcasting,
for practically all the world as simultaneous auditors. Just as the birth of the printing press
made it necessary for equity to inaugurate a protection for literary intellectual property,
so these latter-day inventions make demands upon the creative and ever-evolving energy
of equity to extend that protection so as adequately to do justice under current conditions of
life." Ibid., at 435, 632.
188 Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1928), suggests the
doctrine as a means whereby the manufacturer who sells his goods to dealers, thus escaping
the business risks of retailing them himself, may nonetheless retain control over the retailer's
resale practices and over the use to which the goods are put by purchasers from the retailer.
189 Thus, Dr. Holmes's common-law copyright in "The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table"
did not survive serial publication in the Atlantic Monthly so as to enable his executor to
enjoin anotherfrom publishing itin book form. Holmesv. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
o90 "Limited" publication is found in the exhibition of a painting, American Tobacco Co.
v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907), the production of a play, Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S.
424 (1911), and the public performance of a musical composition, McCarthy & Fisher, Inc. v.
White, 259 Fed. 364 (D.C. N.Y., i99), as distinguished from unrestricted circulation of
copies of the painting, drama, or musical' score.
191 Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
'9'Larrowe-Lolsette v. O'Loughlin, 88 Fed. 896 (D.C. N.Y., i898) (unrestricted sale of
printed lectures with stipulation that purchaser was not to show his copy to anyone else);
Wagner v. Conrad, 125 Fed. 798 (D.C. N.Y., r9o3) (unrestricted sale of musical score with
reservation of stage production rights); Savage v. Hoffman, 159 Fed. 584 (D.C. N.Y., i9o8)
(same); Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Publishing Co., iss N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872
(i898) (unrestricted leasing of credit reports with stipulation that lessee was not to show his
copy to anyone else).
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The novelty of the court's treatment of the publication question prob-
ably resulted from its failure to consider that point apart from its consid-
eration of an alternative ground of decision. Prior cases finding a"general"
publication were rejected by the court as being based "upon an assumed
doctrine that restrictions and servitudes cannot be judicially recognized
when imposed as conditions attaching to the sale of chattels." The court
further held that the restrictive legend in this case was not in restraint of
trade or otherwise contrary to public policy (a consideration which is
irrelevant when the restriction is viewed merely as evidence of the extent
of dissemination of his work which the artist has authorized). Out of this
rather confused discussion emerged the conclusion that the restrictive
label imposed a servitude on the use of the record which was enforceable
in equity.
The same majority of the court, and one more judge who concurred on
this ground alone, found a third basis for its decision in the law of unfair
competition. Reliance here was almost entirely on the Associated Press
case, a precedent whose current status is rather dubious.'93 The court had
no difficulty in finding that Waring and WDAS were competitors for the
business of advertisers and that to allow WDAS to use Waring's perform-
ances at a cost of seventy-five cents per selection, even on a sustaining
program, might unfairly jeopardize his continuing ability to sell those per-
formances for $13,500 per week. And the court bolstered its conclusions on
this point with certain considerations smacking of the doctrine of "moral
right": It found that Waring's reputation might be damaged both by the
broadcasting of records made before the orchestra had reached its present
state of artistic proficiency and by the incessant broadcasting of any of its
recordings.
Judge Maxey, concurring separately, argued-and cited the fathers of
the doctrine to prove it-that the real basis for the protection accorded
the artist was to be found in the right of privacy. Here judge Maxey
seemed to be laboring under the same sort of conceptualistic cloudiness
that characterized the majority's treatment of the common-law copyright
question. True, Warren and Brandeis had suggested that the artist's right
to privacy left it to him" to decide whether that which is his shall be given
to the public" and "to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given,"
but there is nothing in their position to support Judge Maxey's conclusion
that Waring could make copies of his performance available to all who
cared to buy, yet retain the right to specify the use which the purchasers
193 State and lower federal courts have been reluctant to apply the Associated Press doc-
trine to analogous situations. See Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1309-15
(194o); Baer, Performer's Right to Enjoin Unlicensed Broadcasts of Recorded Renditions,
ig N.C.L. Rev. 202, 208-10 (194r).
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could make of those copies. "The right is lost.., when the author him-
self communicates his production to the public."'
94
But, whatever the imperfections in its dialectic, the Pennsylvania court
had provided the performing artist with some legal basis for the collection
of royalties on the commercial use of his recordings,'95 and NAPA set about
to get similar decisions in other jurisdictions. Before the decision on ap-
peal in the WDAS case had come down, NAPA had met defeat in two
other cases. Because of its inability to show that Frank Crumit had re-
quired Decca to use the restrictive label which appeared on his records,
NAPA was unable to enjoin their use by a broadcaster in New York.196
And a similar attempt to enjoin the use of Ray Noble's records in a tap
room in Massachusetts failed because Noble had assigned to RCA "all
rights in and to the matrices and records" and hence was held to have no
standing to claim any interest in the recorded performance.
97
Neither of these difficulties arose in Waring v. Dunlea,98 a suit to enjoin
a North Carolina radio station from using electrical transcriptions made
by Waring and bearing notices that they were to be used only on the Ford
Motor program. Although this presented an ideal case for the application
of the common-law copyright doctrine (the transcription never having
been made available to the public), the rather jumbled opinion accom-
panying the injunction seems to be based on a blend of the concepts of un-
fair competition and equitable servitude.
By this time the broadcasters had turned to legislative halls. The North
Carolina legislature immediately enacted a statute cancelling the Dunlea
decision, 99 and the same statute was adopted in South Carolina shortly
thereafter20 0 and in Florida two years later.
2 0
'
The recording companies were also developing an interest in the matter.
When NAPA brought an action in the federal district court in New York
194 Warren and Brandeis, op. cit. supra note i8o, at 198-99.
19S Although station WDAS stopped using Waring records after this decision, NAPA has
not so far employed the decision to exact royalties from Pennsylvania broadcasters. Letter
from Leslie W. Joy, General Manager, WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., Feb. 5, 1948.
296 Crumit v. Marcus Loew Booking Agency, i62 N.Y. Misc. 225, 293 N.Y. Supp. 63 (1936).
197 Noble v. One Sixty Commonwealth Ave., Inc., i9 F. Supp. 67r (Mass., 1937).
,98 26 F. Supp. 338 (N.C., 1939).
'99 N.C. Code Ann. (Mitchie, 1939) § 5V26(s): "When any phonograph record or electrical
transcription, upon which musical performances are embodied, is sold in commerce for use in
this state, all asserted common law rights to further restrict or to collect royalties on the com-
mercial use made of such recorded performances by any person is hereby abrogated and
expressly repealed."
200 3 Code of Laws of S.C. (1942) § 6641. 2o Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 543.02, 543.03.
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in the name of Paul Whiteman to enjoin the use of Whiteman's records by
radio station WNEW, RCA filed an ancillary bill seeking similar injunc-
tive relief plus an adjudication that Whiteman had no interest in the rec-
ords. The case was submitted on RCA's bill and on evidence showing that
all RCA records issued since 1932 had borne legends stating that they were
not to be used for radio broadcast or were not to be used commercially,
that prior to 1934 Whiteman's contract with RCA had assigned to the
latter all"rights and equities. .. in and to the matrices and records," and
that since 1934 the contract specified that RCA "does not acquire the
right to manufacture or sell, or otherwise dispose of, records for broad-
casting."
The District Court held i) that Whiteman had a common-law copy-
right in his performance which he had assigned to RCA on records made
prior to 1934, but which he had retained on all records made after that
time, 2) that there was no common-law copyright in the records themselves
which RCA could claim by virtue of its contribution to their production,
3) that the issuance of records bearing the restrictive label after 1932 con-
stituted a "limited" publication only, so that the common-law copyright
in the performances recorded thereon had survived, and 4) that in any
event the broadcasting of records, regardless of the restrictive label, con-
stituted unfair competition as against both Whiteman and RCA.2 12
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found all
of this unpersuasive. Assuming for the purpose of its decision that White-
man had a common-law copyright in his performance and, "what is far
more doubtful," that RCA had a similar copyright in the recording, the
court held that such rights were lost with the issuance of the records for
public sale and that the restrictive labels would not operate either to limit
the publication or to impose an equitable servitude. Nor did it view this
case as an instance of unfair competition-International News Service v.
Associated Press was to be confined to its particular facts. As for "the
strange assertion that to broadcast the records in some way invades some-
body's 'right of privacy'-presumably Whiteman's," the court found it
hardly worthy of mention. More difficult was the problem presented by
the fact that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had reached a contrary
decision. That decision established the law in Pennsylvania,203 and it
meant that the broadcasting of Whiteman's records would constitute a
a- RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787 (N.Y., 1939).
203 Although the court here recognized that the matter is one of state law, it did not purport
to examine the New York decisions in reaching its own conclusions. Had it done so, it would
have encountered some of the few cases lending support to Professor Chafee's doctrine of
equitable servitudes. See Baer, op. cit. supra note 193, at 206.
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tort in that state. But there was no way in which WNEW could route its
broadcasts around Pennsylvania, and the court finally concluded that it
would not enjoin an otherwise lawful broadcast in order to prevent com-
mission of a tort in Pennsylvania.204
NAPA's dismay at this reversal must have been shared by the record-
ing companies, because immediately after RCA's victory in the district
court, RCA, Columbia, and Decca had served notice on the broadcasters
that they must purchase licenses to use their records.20 Those claims were
abandoned after the circuit court's decision had deprived the recording
companies of any support as a matter of common law, although a then
recent Supreme Court decision provided an entirely separate basis for
their claims in the law of patents. In General Talking Pictures Corp. v.
Western Electric Co.2°6 the Supreme Court upheld the licensing system of a
patent pool consisting of A.T.& T., General Electric Company, and RCA,
whereby some retailers were licensed to sell patented amplifying tubes
only for radio use and others were licensed to sell them only for non-radio
use. The Court also affirmed the holding that one who purchased ampli-
fying tubes for use in talking picture equipment from a retailer known to
the purchaser to be licensed to sell only for radio use was guilty of con-
tributory infringement. Phonograph records issued by RCA, Columbia,
and Decca had long carried on their labels a legend reading:
Licensed by Mfr. under U.S. Patents [citing numbers] only for non-commercial use
on phonographs in homes. Mfr. and original purchaser agree that this record shall not
be resold nor used for any other purpose.
Hence, the General Talking Picture case seems apt precedent in support of
the demands which the recording companies originally predicated on the
district court's decision in the Whiteman case. Nevertheless, whether from
lack of confidence in their patents, from doubts about the attitude of the
new Justices toward the General Talking Picture case207 and the doctrine
204 RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 14 F. 2d 86 (C.C.A. 2d, 294o), cert. den. 31x
U.S. 712 (1940).
20S NAB Reports 3652 (Aug. 1i, 1939); ibid., at 3665 (Aug. is, 1939); ibid., at 3849 (Nov.
20, 1939); Pforzheimer, Copyright Protection for the Performing Artist in His Interpretative
Rendition, ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium 9, 20(1939).
2 304 U.S. 175 (1938), opinion on reargument 3o5 U.S. 124 (1938), rehearing den. 305
U.S. 675 (1939).
207 The original decision in the case was 5 to x, with Justice Black dissenting and Justices
Roberts, Cardozo, and Reed not participating. On reargument, the decision was 5 to 2, Justice
Cardozo having died, Justice Roberts again not participating, and Justice Reed joining Justice
Black in dissent. Within a year after the decision on reargument, Justice Brandeis had re-
tired and Justice Butler had died, leaving only Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds
and Stone of the majority still on the Court.
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of contributory infringement,'2 0 or from other considerations of business
policy, the recording companies made no attempt to enforce their patent
notices, and those notices have recently disappeared from Victor and Co-
lumbia labels.
Although the Whiteman case is the last NAPA effort to reach reported
court decision, NAPA has not abandoned its attempt to secure royalties
for the recording artist. Since 1936 it has had bills to give the performer a
statutory copyright continuously before Congress, and the Scott Bill was
introduced in the 8oth Congress for that purpose.20 9
As long as it is the national policy to give a statutory copyright to the
compilers of telephone directories2'0 and citators,211 the musical perform-
er's plea for copyright can hardly be rejected on "artistic" grounds. And
the fact that the Constitution authorizes Congress to "promote the Prog-
ress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries"" ' has not been thought to prevent an award of statutory copy-
right on such non-written works as photographs"3 and motion pictures." 4
A more serious difficulty is that of deciding who should receive the copy-
right. Rarely is a recorded musical performance the work of one man. At
the very least it embodies the work of an orchestra, and usually it includes
the contribution of one or more vocalists. Because of the number of people
involved in any one performance and because the composition of even the
most established orchestras is continually changing, a copyright shared by
all participants in the performance would soon prove so unwieldy as to
be unworkable. And few orchestras other than Waring's are incorporat-
ed."5 The simplest solution, of course; would be to give the copyright to
the recording company," 6 and this course has been recommended because
209 See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 66i (1944), rehearing
den. 321 U.S. 802 (z944), motion to clarify den. 323 U.S. 672 (1944).
"9 H.R. 1270, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (1947). Like all its predecessors, this bill died in com-
mittee.
210 Leon v. Pacific T.&T. Co., 91 F. 2d 484 (C.C.A. 9th, 1937).
21, Shepard v. Taylor, 193 Fed. 991 (C.C.A. 2d, 1912).
2 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8 (clause 8; italics added).
23 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Saxony, zii U.S. 53 (1884).
"14 MGM Distributing Corp. v. Bijou Theater, 3 F. Supp. 66 (Mass., 1933).
=S As part of its attempt to relieve the musician of the taxes imposed on "employers"
under the social security laws (see note 53 supra), the AFM in 1941 adopted a rule forbidding
incorporation of bands and orchestras. AFM By-Laws Art. X, § 58 (947).
6 One consequence of giving a copyright to English record manufacturers has been that
the English Musicians' Union, which is as well organized and as opposed to mechanical music
as the AFM, has reached agreements with the recording companies whereby BBC is required
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of its simplicity,"7 but it hardly seems calculated to bring the benefits of
the copyright to the musical performer. At one time NAPA included an
express provision in its bill giving the copyright to the orchestra leader, 21
and while strategy has dictated omission of that provision in subsequent
bills, NAPA still favors that arrangement.219 But NAPA's membership is
made up only of orchestra leaders and vocalists well enough established
to be able to protect their interests. There is little reason to believe that
the instrumentalists in the orchestra would derive much benefit from a
copyright awarded to the conductor.
Although considerably more complex than either of the above solutions,
the only plan which offers protection to all of the musical performers seems
to be one which gives an interest in the copyright to each of them but re-
quires all to assign their interests in each recorded performance to one
who would hold the copyright as agent only for licensing purposes. Just as
the music publishers have as a matter of practice become the assignees of
the composer's recording rights, and ASCAP and Broadcast Music, Inc.,
the assignees of his performance rights, it may reasonably be assumed that
trade practice would eliminate problems arising out of numerous perform-
ers' copyright interests in different recordings by channeling all assign-
ments of those interests to a few licensing agents. And the performer could
be protected against abuses to which the composer has been subject by a
provision in the statute limiting the compensation of the licensing agent.
gradually to reduce the amount of broadcasting time devoted to phonograph records to a
maximum of ten hours per week. The Economist 132 (July 24, 1948).
17 Pforzheimer, op. cit. supra note 205, at 31. It has also been suggested that the copyright
should be given to the record manufacturer because he is "the entrepreneur who brought to-
gether capital, artistic talent and technical necessities," Littauer, The Present Legal Status of
Artists, Recorders and Broadcasters in America, 3 Geistiges Eigentum 217, 233 (Holland,
1938), and because in an analogous situation statutory copyright has already been given to the
producer of motion pictures. Diamond and Adler, Proposed Copyright Revision and Phono-
graph Records, ii Air L. Rev. 29, 49 (r94o); Hess, Copyrightability for Acoustic Works in
the United States, 4 Geistiges Eigentum x83, 197-98 (1939). Neither these proposals nor
the suggestion that copyright be given to the recorder with a statutory requirement that a
certain proportion of the royalty fees be paid to the performer, 49 Yale L.J. 559 (1940), makes
any attempt to explain how promotion of progress in science and useful arts requires the award
of copyright for the practice of a process already the subject of patent.
21, H.R. 66o, 7 6th Cong. ist Sess. (r939).
2,9 Witness the following colloquy from hearings on the Scott Bill:
"MR. WALTR: Mr. Spieser, if H.R. 127o became a law, would not every musician in a
band be entitled to copyright his individual contribution to the interpretation of a musical
piece?
"MR. SPEISER: That would be true, sir.... But we would regulate by assignment. The
person entitled would be the conductor of the band or the orchestral association under whose
charter the band is performing.... The particular technicalities, sir, are of minor impor-
tance.... Due precaution would be taken before filing application of a copyright." Hearings,
op. cit. supra note 183, at 211.
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In any event, the only definite observation that can be made about the
latest version of NAPA's proposal on this point is that it is impossible to
determine from its provisions where the copyright would be lodged.220
The Scott Bill would have granted a copyright on "recordings which em-
body and preserve any acoustic work in a fixed permanent form on a disk,
film, tape, record, or any and all other substances, devices, or instru-
mentalities, by any means whatever, from or by means of which it may
be acoustically communicated or reproduced." The copyright would have
carried the exclusive right not only to "make or to procure the making"
of such recordings, but also to "publish and vend such recordings of
sound; and to communicate and reproduce the same acoustically to the
public, for profit." But nowhere was the holder of such copyright identi-
fied. Although NAPA's purpose is clear, that purpose was not made
explicit in the bill.
But, whatever the form of the bill, NAPA has strong opposition to over-
come. Leading that opposition, of course, are the National Association of
Broadcasters and the manufacturers and operators of juke boxes.2 2 '
ASCAP, which had provided testimony for Waring in the WDAS case,
has changed its mind and joined Broadcast Music, Inc., the Songwriters'
Protective Association, and the Music Publishers' Association in opposi-
tion-too many copyrights may clog the sale of musical works.2l No
change has occurred in the position of the recording companies. Their
view now, as in 1936, is that copyright protection should by all means be
extended to recordings, but that the copyright should be given to the re-
cording company. 3 They present the same argument which the district
court rejected as a basis for common-law copyright in the Whiteman case:
The technique of the recorder in operating the recording equipment is
220 Because of this and other ambiguities the Copyright Office concluded that "whatever
may be the merits of granting copyright to acoustic recordings, there are so many technical
defects in the bill that the Copyright Office should not recommend it." Ibid., at 263-66.
-1 Juke boxes are now exempted from the composer's right to collect royalties on public
performances of his work for profit by a proviso in the Copyright Act that "the reproduction
or rendition of a musical composition by or upon coin-operated machines shall not be deemed a
public performance for profit unless a fee is charged for admission to the place where such re-
production or rendition occurs." 17 U.S.C.A. § i(e) (Supp., 1947). But ASCAP is sponsoring a
bill to eliminate this exemption, H.R. 2570, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (i947), and NAPA, anticipat-
ing the possibility of the performer acquiring a copyright, has a similar bill, H.R. 1269, 8oth
Cong. ist Sess. (1947).
"'Hearings, op. cit. supra note 183, at I6-ig, 25-51, 72-77, 84-86. Since the NAPA bill
is not confined to musical recordings, it is also opposed by the Authors' League of America.
Ibid., at 279-83.
" Hearings, op. cit. supra note 169, at 622-25, 631-45, 1363-67; hearings, op. cit. supra
note 183, at 63--69, 285-91.
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fully as important to artistic creation as is the performance of the musi-
cian,'2 4 and if the copyright is given to the record manufacturer he "can
then be free to share with the performer in any compensation which he
receives for the use of that record.' ' s
Least decisive of all interested parties in its attitudeftoward NAPA's
campaign has been the AFM. In 1936 it appeared in support of the
NAPA bill;226 in 1937 it made a financial contribution to NAPA227 and
adopted a rule pr6viding for the expulsion of "any member who assigns
any property right in any recording to any recording company, or to any
other party without the consent of the American Federation of Musi-
cians" ;8 and President Weber reported to the 194o convention that the
AFM was still supporting NAPA's efforts to amend the copyright laws .229
But since that time the Federation has maintained a discreet silence on
the entire matter.
Fundamentally, of course, NAPA's program is in conflict with the Fed-
eration's policy on recorded music. The AFM, as representative of all the
musicians, is opposed to their displacement by mechanical reproduction,
despite the fact that a few of its members are able to find employment in
the making of such reproductions.30 Any action which it may take in
opposition to the use of mechanical music will be contrary to the interests
of those few members, and the only effect of NAPA's campaign to in-
crease the value of those interests must be to lessen the enthusiasm of such
members for the Federation's policy.
But, while the AFM has vacillated in its attitude toward NAPA, it
=4 The broadcasters' reply to this argument is that their studio engineers make a similar
contribution in "mixing" a musical show at the time of broadcast. Ibid., at 81-82. Hearings,
op. cit. supra note 183, at 81-82.
- Ibid., at 53.
-
6 Hearings, op. cit. supra note i69, at 662-64, 668-72.
= Hearings, op. cit. supra note 183, at 664.
=" AFM By-Laws Art. X, § 57 (1947)-
=9 International Musician 7 (June i94o). New York Local 802, which has a high proportion
of recording musicians in its membership, made a financial contribution to NAPA in 194o.
Hearings, op. cit. supra note 183, at 664.
23o According to trade estimates, only about 5,ooo AFM members derive any substantial
amount of income from recording and transcribing work. Of this number, 5o in New York
and another 500 in Hollywood supplement such employment with performances on live radio
shows, and their combined income runs from $12,000 to $2o,ooo annually. The remaining
4,000 are the musicians in "name bands" who earn about $i,ooo annually from recording
and transcribing engagements. About fifteen or twenty of the leaders of these bands have been
able to get provisions in their recording contracts giving them royalties. Variety, p. i (Oct. 22,
1947), ibid., p. 43 (Oct. 29, 1947). The AFM corroborates the 5,ooo figure, but claims that the
average musician, excluding orchestra leaders, earns less than $4oo per year from recording
engagements. Hearings, op. cit supra note 91, at 335, 390.
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launched its own campaign against the use of recorded music shortly
after NAPA began its suit in the WDAS case. The initiative came from
Chicago Local io, which announced early in 1937 that after February i of
of that year it would not permit its members to make recordings or tran-
scriptions except under such conditions as the Local's executive board
should deem best calculated to "end for all time the menacing threat of
canned music competition. ' 123I And in June of the same year a number of
resolutions calling for similar action by the Federation were referred by
the national convention to the Executive Board with full power to act on
the matter.2 v
Armed with this authority, the national officers entered into negotia-
tions with the broadcasters and emerged with agreements requiring radio
stations approximately to double their expenditures for staff musicians
during the next two-year period. 2_3 Shortly thereafter, the AFM required
each of the recording and transcription companies, as a condition to fur-
ther performance by AFM members, to operate under a yearly"license"
issued by the Federation. The terms of this license, which seems to have
been designed solely for the purpose of capitalizing on the WDAS de-
cision, required the licensee to label every transcription with a legend re-
stricting its use to the specific purpose for which it was made, and to label
every phonograph record with a statement that it was "only for non-
commercial use on phonographs in homes.' 234
These arrangements settled the AFM's relations with the recording
industry and the broadcasters for a time, but while negotiations with the
broadcasters for renewal of the quota agreements were pending in 1939,
Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold published a statement list-
ing the trade-union practices which the Department of Justice considered
231 International Musician 3 (Jan. 1937). Cessation of the use of all mechanical music had
been one of the demands accompanying a strike called by Local io against Chicago radio
stations in 1931, but the strike was settled without any concession from the broadcasters on
that point. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 173, at i6.
232 International Musician i (Aug. 1937).
233 Each of the national network originating stations in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles
was required to increase its expenditures by $6o,ooo annually. All other stations affiliated with
networks undertook an annual aggregate increase of $1,5oo,ooo. Unaffiliated stations whose
gross income for 1937 exceeded $20,000 agreed to spend an annual sum equal to 5 per cent
of the amount by which that gross income exceeded $15,ooo. None of these agreements
fixed wage scales for the staff musicians-that was left to negotiations between the stations
and the various AFM Locals. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 75, at 9i-ioi; Hearings, op. cit.
supra note 173, at 16; NAB Reports 3807 (Nov. 3, 1939)-
234 AFM Standing Resolutions 52 (1938). Although no wage scales were specified in the
license, most of the recording bands are traveling bands, and for that reason the Federation has
fixed recording and transcribing rates at the national level since 1929.
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"unquestionable violations of the Sherman Act." Included in the list were
"unreasonable restraints designed to compel the hiring of useless and un-
necessary labor."'' 5 As will later appear, that advice proved poor proph-
ecy,26 but it was enough at the time to arouse doubts in AFM councils
as to the wisdom of negotiating another quota agreement on a national
scale, and President Weber advised the Locals early in 1940 to seek their
own terms with the broadcasters.
Since that time, negotiations for staff musicians have been conducted
between the Locals and the individual stations,2 37 with the Locals at-
tempting not only to secure wage increases commensurate with rising
living costs but also to obtain their own quota agreements in order to
prevent reduction in employment. Data collected by the FCC indicate
that they have not been completely successful. In 1940 the four national
networks and 765 standard stations employed 2,237 staff musicians at
average weekly salaries of $6o238 In 1945 nine networks and 876 standard
stations employed 2,220 staff musicians at average weekly salaries of
$81.39 In 1947 seven networks and 924 standard stations employed 1,939
staff musicians at average salaries of $87.240 And the three-year contracts
concluded between AFM Locals and network originating stations in
March 1948-which set the pattern for the industry-provide for no in-
crease in quotas or in compensation.24'
The above figures, it should be noted, do not give the full picture on
the employment of musicians in the broadcasting industry. The AFM
estimates that its members are currently earning $23,ooo,ooo a year from
radio.24 2 On the basis of an FCC survey for the week beginning Febru-
ary i, 1947, it appears that the broadcasters paid about $8,767,oo0 to
their 1,939 staff musicians last year, and paid another $2,777,000 to em-
ploy 1,423 part-time musicians.2 43 The AFM estimate would leave ap-
235 Department of Justice Press Release, Nov. 20, 2939, reprinted in Hearings, op. cit.
supra note 173, at 62-64 and in Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business 249-53 (1940).
236 See United States v. International Hod Carriers and Common Laborers District Coun-
cil, 313 U.S. 539 (i941), discussed in text at note 259 infra.
237 But the national officers of the AFM participate in negotiations between Locals and net-
work originating stations in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles.
238 FCC, Statistics of the Communications Industry in the United States for the Year
Ended December 31, 194o, at Y40 (1942).
39 NAB Reports 63 (Jan. 28, 2946).
240 FCC, Public Notice 8304 (June 23, 1947).
241 Variety, p. 38 (Mar. 24, 1948). The new contracts run until January 3I, i95I.
242 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 68, at 228; Hearings, op. cit. supra note 9i, at 337.
243 FCC, Public Notice 8304 (June 23, 1947).
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proximately $I1,456,ooo as the earnings of musicians who are employed
for specific programs and are paid by the advertising agencies or the pro-
gram sponsors rather than by the station operators. But the total number
of musicians employed full-time or part-time to supply music for pro-
grams reaching more than 70,ooo,o00 radio sets244 probably does not ex-
ceed 6,ooo, and the average local station employs "less than I of a full
time musician. ' 45
While the Locals were dealing with the problem of employment in the
broadcasting station, new vigor was brought to the AFM's national
leadership with the retirement in 1940 of 74-year-old President Joseph
Weber and the election of James C. Petrillo as his successor. Petrillo im-
mediately imposed the ban on cooperative radio programs and initiated
the boycotts which resulted in the unionization of the Boston Symphony
Orchestra and the bringing of all American Guild of Musical Artists in-
strumental and conductor members into the AFM246 Then he addressed
himself to the problem of the phonograph record and the transcription.
From the 1941 national convention he secured authority to take action
against mechanical music,247 and ini June 1942 he notified the recording
and transcription companies that their AFM licenses, which expired
August i, would not be renewed. Although he subsequently offered to
permit AFM members to make records for home use only, the recording
companies disclaimed any power so to limit their use, and on August i the
musicians stopped making records .24
Reaction to this move was cataclysmic. The Federation and its Presi-
dent became, almost overnight, subjects of nation-wide interest. Editorial
writers and columnists throughout the land labored their readers with im-
passioned dissertations on "dictatorship," "labor czars," and "musical
Hitlers." Elmer Davis, as Director of the Office of War Information,
fanned the flames by injecting patriotism into the controversy. He an-
nounced tliat "the elimination of records... for use in restaurants, can-
244 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 91, at 9, 53.
245 FCC, Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees 39 (1946), popularly and
unpopularly known as the FCC "Blue Book" and hereafter so cited.
246See Countryman, The Organized Musicians: I, i6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 56, 70-71 (1948).
Petrillo also initiated negotiations resulting in 1942 in the termination of the AFM-IASTE
agreement, which had been of little value to the AFM for the past twenty years and which
operated to restrict the employment opportunities of AFM members because of IASTE'S
lengthy unfair list. International Musician i (Apr. 1942).
247 Ibid., at i (Aug. 1041).
248 Although the musicians continued for a time to make transcriptions which were used
only once by any one station, the recording ban was extended to cover such transcriptions
early in September 1942.
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teens and soda parlors where members of the armed forces go for recrea-
tion, and for use in factories where war workers use juke boxes for or-
ganized relaxation" would seriously jeopardize morale "in the critical
months ahead-months which may well decide the fate of this country's
war effort," and that elimination of transcriptions would jeopardize the
existence of "several hundred" small radio stations and thus "seriously
interfere with the communication of war information and messages vital
to the public security." Consequently, he called upon Petrillo "on behalf
of the people of the United States and on behalf of the War Department,
the Navy Department, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Treasury
Department, the Office of Civilian Defense, and the Office of War Infor-
mation," to end the recording ban.249
The fact that the AFM's recording ban did not have the effect of"elimi-
nating," or even diminishing, the production of phonograph records,25S
but operated only to prevent the recording of new musical compositions
after August i, in no way diminished the effectivendss of the Davis letter
or the indignation occasioned by the Federation's refusal to comply-with
the Davis request.
When AFM leaders, with characteristic lack of diplomacy, compounded
their sins by demanding that NBC cease broadcasting the performances
of student musicians from the National Music Camp, government
agencies were stimulated to action. The Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce launched inquiries into AFM activities.251 The FCC conducted
a survey of the radio industry and reported to the Senate committee that
167 of the 89o standard stations then operating would probably be unable
to continue without recorded and transcribed music.252 The Department
of Justice brought an injunction action under the anti-trust laws.
The Senate inquiry inspired several bills aimed at AFM practices,2s3
249 Letter from Davis to Petrillo, July 28, 1942, reprinted in Hearings, op. cit. supra note
173, at 6-7.
2so From their existing stock of matrices the recording companies continued to press and sell
as many records as they could get material to manufacture under War Production Board
quotas. In i944 a War Labor Board panel found that "the number of pressings has been
limited only by the supply of material and mechanical labor." Electrical Transcription Manu-
facturers, i6 War Lab. Rep. 369, 378 (I944).
25, Hearings, op. cit supra note 173; Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Inter-
state Commerce pursuant to S. Res. 81, 7 8th Cong. ist Sess. (1943) (unpublished); Hearings,
op. cit. supra note 89.
-n Hearings, op. cit. supra note 173, at 33. The FCC prediction was based upon the fact
that these 167 stations used recorded or transcribed music for more than 8o per cent of their
musical programs and that their net income before taxes was less than $5,ooo.
-n S. 2874, 7 7 th Cong. 2d Sess. (1942) (recording ban); S. 1332, 7 8th Cong. ist Sess. (i943),
(recording ban); S. 1957, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. (1944) (student broadcasts); H.R. 1648 and
S. 63, 7 9 th Cong. ist Sess. (i945) (student broadcasts).
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two of which, designed to forbid interference with student broadcasts, suc-
cessfully passed the Senate,254 but Congress' preoccupation with questions
of greater importance precluded definitive legislative action during the
war. Meanwhile, the Department of Justice went to trial in its anti-trust
suit.
At the outset, the Department was confronted with a rather formidable
body of precedent. Since 1932 the Norris-LaGuardia Act255 had forbidden
the federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes, and had defined
"labor dispute" to include "any controversy concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment... whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee." Two years before the
recording ban, in Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Co.,256 the
Supreme Court had decided that this Act meant that no injunction should
be issued in a labor dispute even though it was sought on the ground that
the union's activity violated the Sherman Act. And the Court had found
that a labor dispute existed even though the milk wagon drivers' union
sought to compel dairy operators to cease using "independent vendors"
and to hire union drivers to distribute their products, by picketing the
retail stores which purchased milk from the "independent vendors" rather
than by action taken directly against the dairy operators whose labor
practices it sought to change.
Then there was the Hutcheson case.257 Since the suit against the AFM
was not a criminal action, the government was not here concerned with
the mental gymnastics which Justice Frankfurter had employed to revive
the Clayton Act's exemption from criminal prosecution without disturb-
ing the decisionsB which had destroyed that exemption. But the Hutcleson
decision had also found a labor dispute where the carpenters' union sought
to compel operators of a brewery to take certain work from the machinists
and give it to the carpenters by calling strikes against the brewery, a con-
struction company employed by the brewery, and a construction company
employed by one who leased certain properties from the brewery, by pick-
eting both the brewery and its lessee, and by boycotting the brewery's
product.
Finally, there was the case of the Hod Carriers, prosecuted under the
Sherman Act for calling a strike against certain construction companies
2S4 S. 1957 and S. 63, op. cit. supra note 253.
47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § ioi et seq. (1947).
2s6 311 U.S. 9i (1940).
2s7 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), discussed in text at note iso supra.
258 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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to compel the companies either to cease using concrete truck-mixers or to
hire standby employees whenever the truck-mixers were used. After a dis-
trict court had dismissed the indictment in that case, the Supreme Court
had affirmed without opinion on the authority of the Hutcheson decision.25 9
These decisions pretty well bracketed the AFM case. The government's
complaint alleged that the purpose of the recording ban was to compel
radio stations to cease using records and transcriptions and to compel
hotels, restaurants, taverns, cabarets, etc., to cease using juke boxes.26 °
On this theory the AFM, like the unions of the milk wagon drivers, the
carpenters and the hod carriers, was seeking more work for its members.
Like those unions, it sought to eliminate competition in its labor market.
Like the unions of the milk wagon drivers and the carpenters, it resorted
to a secondary boycott rather than to activity directly aimed at those
whose labor practices it sought to affect. Like the hod carriers, it was re-
sisting technological change rather than live competition. The only signifi-
cant difference between the AFM case and any of those already decided
was one which seemed to bring the dispute more clearly within the Norris-
LaGuardia Act: Unlike some of those against whom union activity was
directed in the Milk Wagon Drivers and Hutcheson cases, the recording
and transcription companies were employers of union members.
With the law in this discouraging state, Assistant Attorney General
Arnold offered a twofold argument in support of his complaint: 6' i) He
argued that the AFM's recording ban had nothing to do with terms and
conditions of employment. The apparent contradiction of the Milk Wagon
Drivers case was ignored.262 The Hutcheson case was said to be distinguish-
able because it "involved only a jurisdictional strike." As for the Hod Car-
riers case, "no contractors were forced out of business. An unnecessary
charge was imposed which could be and was collected. In the instant case
the unnecessary charge was complete prohibition and was aimed at the
elimination of smaller networks and smaller radio stations." 2) Relying
2s9 United States v. International Hod Carriers and Common Laborers District Council,
313 U.S. 539 (1941).
260 The complaint also included allegations based upon the National Music Camp incident
and upon a strike called by the AFM against the Don Lee Broadcasting System, a regional
network, to compel one of the stations affiliated with the network to hire more musicians.
26, Statement as to Jurisdiction, Docket No. 670, October Term, 1942, Supreme Court of
the United States.
2 Compare the statement in the majority opinion in that case: "To say... that the con-
flict here is not a good faith labor issue, and therefore there is no 'labor dispute,'is to ignore the
statutory definition of the terms; to say, further, that ihe conditioned abandonment of the
vendor system, under the circumstances, was an issue unrelated to labor's efforts to improve
working conditions, is to shut one's eyes to the everyday elements of industrial strife." Milk
Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Co., 311 U.S. 9i, 99 (i94o).
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on a dictum in the Hutcheson opinion (later to be confirmed in the Allen
Bradley decision) that the Sherman Act would apply should a union
"combine with nonlabor groups," he argued that"the union seeks a com-
bination with manufacturers of phonograph records and electrical tran-
scriptions to prevent independent radio stations and networks from ac-
quiring such records and to prevent small amusement places from buying
such records, thereby eliminating competing forms of musical produc-
tion." But this argument includes the contention that the AFM sought
to induce the transcription manufacturers to combine against their only
customers and to induce RCA and CBS as manufacturers of records and
transcriptions to conspire against themselves as broadcasters. Further, it
could have been argued with exactly as much force that the hod carriers
were seeking to combine with the construction companies against the
manufacturers of truck-mixers and that the milk wagon drivers were seek-
ing to combine with the dairy operators against the "independent ven-
dors." And any union activity aimed at the elimination of non-union
employees or employees affiliated with a different union, as in the Hutche-
son case, would constitute an attempt to combine with the employer
against such employees. In essence, then, this was merely another way of
putting the first argument-union activity aimed at eliminating competi-
tion in the labor market has nothing to do with "terms and conditions
of employment" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.263
The district court found these arguments insufficient and dismissed the
complaint. On appeal the Supreme Court was able to dispose of the case
summarily, 64 citing the Milk Wagon Drivers decision and New Negro Al-
liance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.26s The latter case did not involve the Sher-
man Act but had found a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act where an organization of Negroes picketed a grocery store
to compel it to abandon its "whites only" employment policy and hire
Negro clerks.
Four days before the Supreme Court's decision was announced, the
AFM offered to terminate the recording ban, which had then been in
effect for six months, if the recording and transcription companies would
agree to pay fixed royalties to the Federation for each record and tran-
263 The rule later announced in the Allen Bradley case seems clearly inapplicable here,
since the manufacturers of records and transcriptions have no economic interest in withhold-
ing their product from radio and juke box use. In fact, all of the major record manufacturers
consider the disc jockeys such stimulators of record sales that they supply them with free
records. Variety, p. 41 (Sept. 3, 1947).
264 United States v. American Federation of Musicians, 318 U.S. 741 (1943).
26s303 U.S. 552 (1938).
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scription made by AFM members. The sums so collected were to be used
"for the purposes of reducing unemployment which has been created in the
main by the use of the above-mentioned mechanical devices and
for fostering and maintaining musical talent and culture and music ap-
preciation; and for furnishing free, live music to the public."'26S The com-
panies, however, refused to consider any such arrangement-not because
of its cost, but because, outof a sudden concern for the union membership,
they objected to contributing to any fund to be "disbursed in the Union's
uncontrolled discretion," and because of the "dangerous fallacy" in the
underlying assumption "that a specific industry owes a special obligation
to persons not employed by it-an obligation based only on such persons'
membership in a union.1217
Instead, anti-trust remedies having failed, they took their case to the
War Labor Board under the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943.268 But
while the WLB hearing was proceeding before a three-man panel, a break
occurred in the hitherto solid ranks of the companies. Decca, producer of
one-fourth of all phonograph records in the United States,269 entered into
a contract with the Federation. Furthermore, Decca brought with it the
World Broadcasting System, the largest manufacturer of library transcrip-
tions (whose stock Decca had recently acquired27°), and WOR Recording
Studios, chief transcription manufacturer for MBS.
This contract, to run until December 31, 1947, constituted a complete
capitulation to the Federation's royalty demands. 71 "In order to give
effect to the principle of a continuing interest which all members of the
Federation have in the use of recordings containing instrumental music,"
the companies agreed to pay royalties ranging from one-fourth cent on a
266 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 75, at io6.
267 Ibid., at 76.
,6 57 Stat. 163 (1943), 5o, App. U.S.C.A. § i5o3 (1944). This Act gave the Board jurisdic-
tion over any "labor dispute" which might lead to "substantial interference with the war
effort." The Board found the recording ban to constitute such a labor dispute and set the case
down for panel hearing in Electrical Transcription Manufacturers, io War Lab. Rep. 157(31943).
269 At the conclusion of its hearings the WLB panel found that Decca, Columbia, and Victor
"issue practically all of the phonograph records in the United States. The annual production
of the three companies is about 130,oooooo records, of which 56,ooo,ooo are made by Victor;
39,o0o,oo0 by Columbia; and 35,oooooo by Decca." Electrical Transcription Manufac-
turers, i6 War Lab. Rep. 369, 372 (1944).
"',° Standard & Poor's Corporation Records (C-E) 1451. In August 1948 Decca sold World
to Frederick W. Ziv Company, largest manufacturer of open-end transcriptions. Broadcasting
22 (Aug. 9, 1948).
271 A copy of the contract is set out in NAB, Special A. F. of M. Bulletin 22 (Oct. I, 1943),
and in International Musician I (Oct. x943).
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thirty-five-cent record to 2 per cent of the sale price of records selling for
more than $2.00. On electrical transcriptions the royalty was 3 per cent of
the companies' gross revenue from sale, lease, or license of such tran-
scriptions, except that transcriptions which were used only once by any
one station were royalty-free. It was also provided that if the AFM should
subsequently enter a contract with other companies "upon terms more
favorable or different" from the Decca contract, the signatories to the
Decca contract could cause their agreement" to be conformed therewith."
Within a month twenty-two small record and transcription manufac-
turers had signed the Decca contract, and four more large transcription
companies had signed a second contract 7 patterned after the Decca
agreement but containing two additional provisions available to the
Decca signatories under the most-favored-company clause of their agree-
ment: i) The AFM agreed not to seek an increase in wage scales prior to
October 1945.273 2) It was specifically provided in the contract that the
royalty payments should be kept by the AFM in a separate fund and used
"only for purposes of fostering and propagating musical culture and the
employment of live musicians, members of the Federation."
Although the "Four Companies" contract was soon accepted by seven-
ty-six more small recording and transcription companies, RCA and Co-
lumbia refused to enter into any such agreement, and the WLB proceed-
ings continued. In March 1944 the panel issued its report, a lengthy docu-
ment written by public member Arthur S. Meyer and substantially con-
curred in by employer member Gilbert E. Fuller, whgrein the dispute
received its first consideration on the merits. Although Meyer was not
impressed by the companies' position that as a matter of principle they
could not agree to make payments into a fund to be controlled by the
Federation, a principle upon which he thought the companies stood "a
little painfully," he found: i) that the union had failed to prove that the
phonograph, the transcription, or the radio had "decreased the employ-
ment of musicians"; 2) that although not more than one-third of the
AFM membership was able to find full-time employment as musicians, the
remaining two-thirds were able to supplement part-time musical work
272 A copy of this contract is set out in NAB, Special A.F. of M. Bulletin 23 (Oct. 29, 1943),
and in International Musician 16 (Nov. 1943).
273 Wage scales at that time were $io per hour for popular records (not more than four
io-inch or three 12-inch matrices to be made in three hours), $14 per hour for classical records
(not more than forty minutes playing time per hour), and $18 per hour for electrical tran-
scriptions (not more than one fifteen-minute transcription per hour). AFM By-Laws Art. XV
(i94). In October 1946 the Federation secured increases which brought the rates to $13-75
for popular records, $19.25 for classical records, and $27.o for electrical transcriptions. AFM,
Wage Scales, Rules and Regulations Applying to Recordings and Transcriptions 3-5 (1946).
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with other employment or to find full-time employment in other fields,
and, at least during a war-time manpower shortage, the union could not
ask for more; and 3) that even if an unemployment problem did exist, the
War Labor Disputes Act authorized the WLB only to prescribe "wages
and hours and all other terms and conditions (customarily included in
collective bargaining agreements) governing the relations between the
parties," and a royalty provision such as that demanded by the AFM was
not "customary." Accordingly, the panel recommended, with labor mem-
ber Max Zaritsky dissenting, that the Board direct termination of the
recording ban and restoration of conditions prevailing on July 31, 1942.274
For all Meyer's painstaking care, his report seems to miss the point of
the Federation's case. It is obvious that the phonograph, considered
apart from its use on radio and juke box, did not decrease the employment
opportunities of musicians-it did just the opposite. Hence, it was not
surprising that the panel could discover President Weber saying in 1926
(while Secretary Hoover's licensing plan was keeping recorded music off
most radio programs and before the introduction of the modern juke box)
that the phonograph record had "advanced the development of the love
of music among the people ... and the result was an increase of employ-
ment opportunities for musicians.27s Although the panel report was
critical of the union's failure to submit data in support of its position, the
ultimate logic of the Federation's position is that the phonograph record
and the transcription have been used by radio stations and operators of
small amusement places to fill a demand which otherwise would have
created more jobs for live musicians. Obviously, no amount of investiga-
tion will prove that there would be more employment for musicians today
if the phonograph and the radio had never been invented. Nor could the
Federation muster statistics to show how many more jobs for live musi-
cians would be made available if there were no juke boxes and if records
and transcriptions were not used on the radio. It is apparent that the
elimination of the juke box and the recorded radio program would in some
measure increase the job opportunities of live musicians. That, in final
analysis, is the Federation's contention, and years of surveying and sta-
tistics-gathering will not give it added weight or precision. But the panel
did not recognize that contention, and its report did not deal with it.
In any event, the WLB did not follow the panel's recommendation. It
accepted the principle of the union-administered royalty fund which the
companies found so distasteful, and it ordered immediate termination of
274 Electrical Transcription Manufacturers, 16 War Lab. Rep. 369, 370 (I944).
27S Ibid., at 380.
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the recording ban and settlement by arbitration of the amount and dispo-
sition of royalty payments.276
But the AFM, with a large part of the battle won, was in no mood to
arbitrate, and it refused to comply with the Board's order. The only
compulsion, aside from adverse publicity, which the War Labor Disputes
Act provided for enforcement of the order was seizure of the business con-
cerned in the event that the Economic Stabilization Director found "that
the war effort will be unduly impeded or delayed" by continuance of the
dispute. Accordingly, when two months of extremely adverse publicity
had failed to daunt the Federation, the Board referred the case to Stabili-
zation Director Vinson, who concluded, reasonably enough, that continu-
ation of the recording ban against RCA and Columbia would not unduly
impede or delay the war effort. President Roosevelt then wired Petrillo,
informing him of the Director's decision, but calling on the union in the
name of patriotism and citizenship to comply with the Board's order
voluntarily 2 77 The Federation refused to accede to this request, pointing
out that it had already reached agreements with 105 recording and tran-
scription companies under which recordings had been made for the past
year, and that under the most-favored-company clause an arbitration
award on terms more favorable to RCA and Columbia might deprive it
of part of the benefits of those agreements.278
The new flurries of editorial indignation caused by this defiance of gov-
ernmental authority may have brought comfort to RCA and Columbia,
but it brought no recording profits. And Jascha Heifetz's switch from
RCA-Victor to Decca2 79 was an omen of even greater long-run loss. Final-
ly, two days after the i944 Presidential election and almost twenty-seven
months after the initiation of the recording ban, RCA and Columbia
capitulated and signed the royalty contract, bringing the record industry
back to full production.
With the end of the war, that industry entered a new era of prosperity.
In 1945 it sold i65,ooo,ooo records280 by 1946 it had raised the figure to
275,000,000,281 and the 1947 output was 350,000,o00.282 A concomitant of
such prosperity is, of course, the rise and fall of numerous new producers,
and there are today literally hundreds of small recorders either in opera-
276 Ibid., at 36g. 278 Ibid., p. i (Oct. Ir, 1944).
277 New York Times, p. i (Oct. 5, 1944). 279 Ibid., p. 14 (Oct. 5, 1944).
8o Taubman, op. cit. supra note 125, at 20.
28, As Crosby Goes, So Goes Chopin, 35 Fortune, No. 5, at 146 (May 2947).
28 Lunde, The American Federation of Musicians and the Record Ban, 12 Pub. Op. Quar.
45, 46 (1948).
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tion or in the process of going in or out of business.283 Nonetheless, RCA-
Victor, Columbia, Decca, and Capitol Records, Inc.-a newcomer which
entered the record and transcription fields in 1942284-account for over
8o per cent of the entire record production. 8s
With the industry in this flourishing state, the Federation had collected
$3,700,000 in royalties by the end of 1947, and the AFM Executive Board,
acting under directions from the national convention,26 distributed
$i,i3o,ooo among the Locals in 1947 according to a plan designed to ac-
commodate both the employment needs of the Locals and the musical
needs of the smaller communities.2 7 With that allocation, supplemented
in some instances by contributions from the Locals and from civic organ-
izations and local government units, the musicians provided some io,ooo
musical performances in ballrooms, concert halls, veterans' hospitals, and
parks. These performances, which were divided almost evenly between
popular and classical music, employed more than 30,000 musicians and
played to audiences in 514 communities.,A similar schedule of perform-
ances in 1948 was financed by a second allotment of $1,736,ooo from the
royalty fund.288
Meanwhile, having acquiesced in the continued use of recorded music
on the air, the Federation sought to invoke the principle it once had ap-
plied to the motion picture theaters-that the music machine should be
operated by a member of the union. As president of Local io, Petrillo had
in 1928 converted Chicago radio stations to the practice of employing
AFM members as platter-turners. But in other stations that work was
done by announcers or studio engineers; in the network-owned stations it
was done by the engineers. In January 1944, however, the AFM reached
283 Sturdiest of the new entrants is MGM, which spent $4,ooo,ooo to convert a Bloomfield,
New Jersey, war plant into a record factory, arranged to have its domestic distribution handled
by the Zenith Radio Corporation and its foreign distribution by Electrical and Musical In-
dustries, Ltd. (which does the same job for Columbia and RCA-Victor), and entered produc-
tion in March 1947. As Crosby Goes, So Goes Chopin, 35 Fortune, No. 5, at 146 (May 1947);
Variety, p. 39 (Aug. 13, 1947).
284 Capitol was formed by songwriter Johnny Mercer, movie producer Buddy DeSylva, and
Hollywood music store proprietor Glenn Wallichs.
2 SSIn terms of the number of records sold, it is estimated that RCA-Victor accounted for
27 per cent of the 1947 output, Decca 25 per cent, Columbia 23 per cent, and Capitol 8 per
cent. Lunde, op. cit. supra note 282, at 46.
286 AFM By-Laws Art. I, § 10 (1947).
287 Each Local received $10.43 per member except the New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles
Locals, which received $io.43 for each of the first 5,ooo members and $2.00 for each additional
member.
288 New York Herald Tribune, § 2, p. 2 (Jan. 25, 1948); Hearings, op. cit. supra note io6, at
THE ORGANIZED MUSICIANS
agreements with the four national networks whereby they undertook to
transfer their platter-turning work to AFM members. But before these
agreements could be put into effect, the National Association of Broad-
cast Engineers and Technicians, an unaffiliated union representing the
engineers employed in NBC and Blue (ABC after December 3o , 1944)
network stations, instituted representation proceedings before the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. On the basis of past bargaining history, the
NLRB certified NABET as collective bargaining representative for units
including platter-turners in NBC and Blue stations, and the only conse-
quence of the AFM's insistence that the networks nonetheless comply
with their contracts with the Federation, and of its belatedly-filed charge
that NABET was company-dominated, was a court order requiring the
two networks to bargain with NABET.28 9 Since the established bargaining
practice at other stations varied only in the identity of the unions whose
members did the platter-turning work,290 the AFM abandoned its attempt
to secure such work for its members outside of Chicago and turned its
attention to other technological problems which arose with the end of
the war.
One such problem was the post-war growth of television, which has
progressed from an experimental operation in 1941 to a commercial enter-
prise which now boasts 39 operating stations, 85 construction permits
granted, and 31o applications pending2 91 Whether this new industry
means more or less employment for musicians is not yet dear. If listener
preference has any effect on the content of programs, television may prove
a boon to the AFM membership. Certainly a televised version of today's
disc-jockey program will have little audience appeal. And if television
proves an effective competitor of the motion picture,2 the musician
289 NLRB v. NBC, i5o F. 2d 895 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
290 NABET also represents the engineers employed at Mutual's station WOR and at some
5o other stations throughout the country. Letter from Harry E. Hiller, Executive Secretary,
NABET, Apr. 9, 1948. The engineers at CBS-owned stations are represented by the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (AFL). Elsewhere, the engineers are represented
either by the IBEW or by the CIO's American Communications Association. Announcers,
who act as platter-turners on some stations, are represented by the American Federation of
Radio Artists (AFL).
291 Television Magazine 2 (Apr. z948); Television Boom, 37 Fortune, No. 5, at 79 (May
1948); Hearings, op. cit. supra note 9i, at 164.
2" There is already some evidence of hedging on this score. Paramount Pictures operates
two television stations, has applied for three more, and has acquired a 3o per cent interest in
Allen B. DuMont Laboratories, Inc., which operates two stations. Warner Brothers and
Twentieth Century-Fox have television applications pending before the FCC, and Twentieth
Century-Fox is currently negotiating for the purchase of ABC, which owns one television
station and has thirteen television affiliates. Television Boom, 37 Fortune, No. 5, at 79, I94-
96 (May 1948); Variety, p.3 (Apr. 21, 1948); ibid., p. 5 (May 12, 1948); 51 Time, No. 5I, at
77 (June 21, 1948). New York Times, p. 33 (Nov. 24, 1948).
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should benefit from the fact that the new medium, even though operating
through network arrangements, must offer its audience a far greater num-
ber of performances than does the movie industry.93 On the other hand,
television will constitute new competition for the legitimate theater, the
ballroom, the concert hall, and standard broadcasting-all of which now
offer employment opportunities for musicians. Moreover, the AFM may
not be able to keep movie film out of the television studio indefinitely.
Confronted with this tangle of possibilities, AFM leaders were unable
to decide whether to welcome television or to combat it, and they finally
reached the rather ostrich-like conclusion that until they could learn more
about it they would have nothing to do with it. Accordingly, they an-
nounced in February 1945 that Federation members would not play for
any television broadcast "until further notice. ' '294
"Further notice" was not given for three years. Then, without having
gained a thing by their television ban, and apparently without even hav-
ing formed any ideas about what they expected to gain, AFM leaders
lifted the ban in new contracts concluded with the network originating
stations last March and shortly thereafter, in order to assist the "infant
industry," agreed on wage scales for television broadcasts which are con-
siderably lower than those applicable to standard broadcasting.2
95
A somewhat more understandable but similarly bootless policy was
pursued by the Federation with respect to FM broadcasting, which had
gotten a fair start before the war and which has expanded rapidly since
wartime restrictions on building were removed .2 6 Insofar as FM broad-
casting meant the opening of new originating stations,97 it provided new
293 During the 1946-47 season, motion picture producers released 313 features, excluding
westerns. Box Office 28 (Nov. 15, 1947).
204 International Musician i (Feb. 1945).
29s Under a six-month contract concluded April 29, 1948, the scale for local television
originations is - the local rate for standard broadcasting; for network originations it is 3 the
standard rate; for duplicated standard-television broadcasts, the prevailing standard scale for
the program is to be increased by $3.75 for sustaining programs and $7.50 for sponsored pro-
grams. It was also agreed that filmed records of a live television network show may be made
for "single uge over any station which is affiliated with the network at the time of the original
telecast." This contract covers network-owned stations only. Television rates for all other
stations are negotiated with the appropriate AFM local. International Musician 6-7 (May
1948).
296 At the close of the war there were forty-eight FM stations in operation. FCC, Twelfth
Annual Report i5 (1946). By September 1948 this number had grown to 64o, with an addi-
tional 388 authorized, and 97 applications pending. FM and Television 44 (Sept. E948).
297 In addition to its advantages of near-perfect fidelity and static-elimination, FM eases
the frequency shortage which previously restricted the number of stations which could operate,
making it technically possible to have from 3,500 to 5,00o additional stations. Siepmann,
Radio's Second Chance 240 (1946).
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opportunities for musical employment. But to the extent that FM sta-
tions were to be operated by the standard broadcasters~g2 as additional
outlets for existing programs, 99 no new employment would result. To
combat the latter tendency, the AFM notified the broadcasters in October
1945 that its members would not perform for any program broadcast
simultaneously over AM and FM outlets unless a standby orchestra was
employed.300
But while the AFM was fashioning its post-war strategy, the post-war
Congress had fashioned the Lea Act,30' and subsection (a) (3) of that Act,
making it unlawful to attempt to compel a radio station "to pay or agree
to pay more than once for services performed, '33 °2 was clearly drawn to fit
the Federation's demand for standbys on duplicate AM-FM broadcasts.
Without more, it seems apparent that this provision was violated by the
AFM for more than a year after the Lea Act was passed. But there is
more:
(c) The provisions of subsection (a) and (b) of this section shall not be held to make
unlawful the enforcement or attempted enforcement, by means lawfully employed,
of any contract right heretofore or hereafter existing or of any legal obligation
heretofore or hereafter incurred or assumed.
Hence, if the contracts between the AFM Locals and the radio stations
contained provisions requiring payment of standby charges whenever a
program was broadcast simultaneously over AM and FM outlets, there
would be no violation of the Act.
But the contracts then in existence, which were renewed for one year
in January 1947, were "absolutely silent on the question of frequency
modulation. ' ' 303 Despite this fact, it was reported by Variety, a usually
well-informed trade sheet, that the networks had persuaded the Depart-
ment of Justice that their contracts brought the AFM within the protec-
2gs Of 380 FM stations operating in January 1948, 293 were operated by AM licensees, and
437 additional AM licensees were either building FM stations or had applied to the FCC for
construction permits. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 9I, at 73, 263.
299 The FCC originally planned to require AM licensees who acquired FM licenses to
devote at least two hours per day to new and original programs, but receded from that position
in the face of outraged protests from the AM broadcasters. Siepmann, op. cit. supra note 297,
at 244-46.
300 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 9 i , at 68. With this move was coupled another blow at an
old menace-the AFM refused to accept any new engagements on FM networks. This ban
affected the Continental Network and twelve regional FM networks. Ibid., at 27, 67, z26.
300 6o Stat. 89 (1946), 47 U.S.C.A. § 506 (Supp., i947).
302 See Countryman, The Organized Musicians: I, i6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 56, 80-82 (1948).
3o Testimony of Joseph H. Ream, executive vice-president of CBS. Hearings, op. cit. supra
note 9z, at 297.
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tion of subsection (c) of the Lea Act,304 and network officials recently took
that position before a congressional committee. NBC's Executive Vice-
President Frank E. Mullen undertook to explain to the committee how
these contracts, which said nothing about duplicate AM-FM broadcast-
ing, nonetheless covered the matter completely:
When we came up to the negotiations of our 1947 agreement... the contract Was
extended for a year, with the only subject discussed being wages and working condi-
tions.
That was by agreement with the union, and was the matter of negotiation, and even
though it is not referred to in the contract,. . . it was dearly understood by both sides
that our contract did not cover it.
Therefore, our lawyers, I think, are quite right in advising us now that the contract
does not cover FM and if we duplicate it without any permission from Mr. Petrillo,
we would be breaching our contract.305
Unfortunately for the development of American jurisprudence, Mr.
Mullen's novel principle of interpretation will not receive judicial test.
The new three-year contracts between network stations and AFM Locals
expressly authorize simultaneous AM-F M broadcasting with no increase
in pay for musicians.306 But the position taken by the AM broadcasters
lends color to the suggestion that they have not accorded FM an un-
qualified welcome. 0 7
Sponsors of the Lea Act did not confine their legislative efforts to mat-
ters of current controversy. They obviously had the existing AFM royalty
contracts with the record and transcription manufacturers in mind when
they drew the subsection providing:
(b) It shall be unlawful, by the use or express or implied threat of the use of force, vio-
lence, intimidation, duress, or by the use or express or implied use of other means,
to coerce, compel or constrain or attempt to coerce, compel or constrain a licensee
or any other person-
(i) to pay or agree to pay any exaction for the privilege of, or on account of, pro-
ducing, preparing, manufacturing, selling, buying, renting, operating, using,
or maintaining recordings, transcriptions, or mechanical, chemical, or electri-
cal reproductions, or any other articles, equipment, machines, or materials,
used or intended to be used in broadcasting or in the production, preparation,
performance, or presentation of a program or programs for broadcasting; or
(3) to pay or agree to pay any exaction on account of the broadcasting, by means
304 Variety, p. 32 (Sept. 3, 1947).
30S Hearings, op. cit. supra note i, at 302.
3o6 Broadcasting 13 (Mar. 22, 1948). The ban on FM network shows has also been lifted.
Letter from Everett L. Dillard, president of the Frequency Modulation Association, June i,
1948.
307 See cautious testimony to that effect by J. N. Bailey, executive director of the Frequency
Modulation Association. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 91, at 77, 91.
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of recording or transcription, of a program previously broadcast, payment
having been made, or agreed to be made, for the services actually rendered in
the performance of such program.
But it is difficult to determine just what they had in mind when they
made the exemption of subsection (c) for "means lawfully employed" in
the enforcement of "any contract right heretofore or hereafter existing"30 8
applicable to the above prohibitions. Clearly, that saved the existing
royalty contracts. And seemingly it would also have saved any subsequent
royalty agreements-if the Federation could secure such agreements with-
out using force, violence, intimidation, duress, or any "other means."
Even that rather remote possibility was apparently enough to disturb
the recording and transcription companies. Through the National Associ-
ation of Broadcasters (which frequently displays a greater concern for the
record manufacturers' problems than the interests of most of its members
would warrant), they maintained the position which the WLB panel found
them occupying "a little painfully" in 1 9 4 2, and during the hearings which
produced the Taft-Hartley Act the NAB called upon Congress for a law
prohibiting the payment of royalties "to unions for their unrestricted
uses. 23o
9
Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act 310 answers that call. It makes it un-
lawful for an employer to make any payment to a "representative of his
employees," with an exception for payments into "a trust fund estab-
lished by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the
employees of such employer, and their families and dependents," such
trust fund to be administered jointly by representatives of the employer
and of the employees. This provision did not affect the distribution of
funds collected under the AFM's existing royalty agreements,31' but
those agreements expired December 31, 1947. And the new law means
that royalties collected by the union under any subsequent agreement can-
not be used to provide employment for any musicians other than those
308 See text following note 302 supra.
309 Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 55 and S. J. Res. 22,
8oth Cong. ist Sess., at 2271 (1947). Similar requests came from the bituminous coal mine
operators, objecting to the "collectivist" royalty-supported benefit plans first included in their
contracts with the United Mine Workers in 1946 while the mines were being operated by the
government. Ibid., at 225-29, 762-70; Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor
on Bills To Amend and Repeal the National Labor Relations Act and for Other Purposes,
8oth Cong. xst Sess., at 99--2o3, 635Y 1225, 2349-50 (1947).
310 6i Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 186 (Supp., i947).
3u Section 3 02(f) provides: "This section shall not apply to any contract in force on the
date of enactment of this Act, until the expiration of such contract, or until July 1, 1948,
whichever first occurs."
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who made the records and transcriptions on which the royalties are paid-
musicians who do not need such assistance. This interference with its un-
employment relief plan served to aggravate the Federation's concern over
a situation which, from its viewpoint, was growing steadily worse.
In the first place, the great post-war rise of the disc-jockey program has
given further impetus to the use of recorded music.-31 Such leading AFM
members as Tommy Dorsey and Duke Ellington have found it profitable
to abandon their orchestras and become disc jockeys. Even Paul White-
man, who had once sought to collect royalties for the broadcasting of his
records, is now busily engaged in the royalty-free broadcasting of his own
and other musicians' recorded performances. New York's station WNEW,
devoting 152 of its 24 hours per day to a stable of six disc jockeys, set the
horrible example. 3"3
And what the disc jockey is doing to the musician's opportunities in
radio, the juke box is doing elsewhere. By the operator's own estimates,
juke boxes now provide recorded music for more than 4oo,00o taverns,
bars, night clubs, cabarets, etc., some of which would otherwise employ
live musicians."3 4 And to this form of mechanical competition must be
added that of the "wired music" services, led by MUZAK of New York,315
which pipe music from electrical transcriptions into some 75o hotels and
restaurants all over the country."6
In view of this growth in the use of recorded and transcribed music, and
while the Taft-Hartley proposals were still pending in Congress, the
AFM's 1947 national convention authorized the Executive Board to initi-
ate another recording ban.3 Five months later, the Federation sent the
following notice to all recording and transcription companies:
3- Trade estimates in 1947 placed the number of disc jockeys at 2800. Variety, p. 41 (Sept.
3, 1947). Some indication of the number of broadcasting hours accounted for by such per-
formers, as well as the current trend in their use, is illustrated by the situation in Chicago.
In 1945 twelve disc jockeys accounted for 125 hours of broadcasting time weekly.
Two years later thirty-nine disc jockeys divided a total of 268 hours. Ibid., p. 30 (July 2,
1947). In New York, ninety-three disc jockeys use 400 hours of broadcasting time per week.
Ibid., p. 49 (Mar. 17, 1948).
313 Frank, Tycoons of the Turntables, i19 Colliers 18 (Mar. 22, 1947).
314 Hearings, op. cit. supra note i83, at io4, iio, 146. Non-industry estimates placed the
total number of juke boxes at 4ooooo seven years ago. Smith, What's Petrillo up To? i86
Harpers Magazine go, 93 (1942).
-, In addition to its wired music business, MUZAK also provided a transcription service
for ABC until recently, when WOR Recording Studios took over that function. Variety, p. 6o
(July 9, 1947).
3,6 Smith, Is There a Case for Petrillo? I12 New Republic 76 (i945); Lunde, op. cit. supra
note 282, at 50.
37 AFM Standing Resolutions 4 (1947).
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Your contract with the American Federation of Musicians for the employment of
its members in the making of musical recordings will expire on December 31, 1947.
This contract will not be renewed because on and after January i, 1948, the mem-
bers of the American Federation of Musicians will no longer perform the services pro-
vided for in said contract.
This notice carries with it our declared intention, permanently and completely, to
abandon that type of employment.3rg
These notices merely confirmed a declaration made four months earli-
er,319 and before they were dispatched the industry had embarked on a
mass scramble to build up a backlog of records and transcriptions before
the end of the year. Every new composition that bore any promise of
popularity was recorded. The musical selections from most of the motion
pictures scheduled for 1948 release went onto matrices. Performers for
transcribed musical programs worked long hours to build a stockpile of
transcriptions. Plans were made to ration all new recordings. Trade ru-
mors credited some companies with enough recordings to last two or three
years, and RCA-Victor with a 25-year supply of matrices for classical
records. 20
In all this rush, the musicians gave the industry complete cooperation,
even to the extent of canceling other engagements in order to devote more
time to the making of matrices, and the Federation made no protest.
Then, a few days before the new recording ban took effect, Petrillo gave
notice of the Federation's claim that under the expiring contracts royal-
ties must be paid to the AFM on all records pressed from matrices pro-
duced prior to December 31, 1947. Although this position finds support
in the language of at least some of the contracts3 2' and in the fact that
royalties were not paid on records made during the period covered by the
contracts from matrices cut prior to the contracts, the recorders refused
to pay royalties on any records made in 1948 from matrices produced
prior to the recording ban.322 In any event, the Taft-Hartley Act quite
dearly applies to any royalty payments on records made after July i,
1948.323
318 International Musician 6 (Nov. 1947).
319 In July 1947 Petrillo told a House committee that the Federation intended to stop making
records and that it might "go into the recording business itself, if we do not conflict with the
anti-trust laws." Hearings, op. cit. supra note 68, at 184. Subsequently, the AFM announced
that it had abandoned the idea of goinginto the recording business. New York Herald Tribune,
p. 21 (June 9, 1948).
320 51 Time, No. 17, at 25-26 (Oct. 27, 1947); ibid., No. 21, at 74 (Nov. 24, 1947).
-2 The "Four Companies" agreement provides for royalty payments on "phonograph
records manufactured by you or others from masters hereafter recorded by you during the
term ofthis agreement." In the Decca contract, the italicized phrase is omitted.
3- Variety, p. 33 (Aug. i8, 1948). 323 Note 311 supra.
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Meanwhile, the production of matrices containing instrumental music
ended with the end of 1947. Early in February 1948 the AFM agreed to
allow its members to make transcriptions designed for one use only pend-
ing negotiation of new contracts with the networks, and the new con-
tracts now provide for the continuation of that practice. 3 4 But with that
one exception the ban was complete. During the first nine months of 1948
neither the Federation nor the companies made any attempt to seek a
settlement whereby the recording ban would be lifted. Indeed it is prob-
able that the recording companies did not want the ban ended until they
had disposed of their accumulated stocks, since many of the recordings
made in the closing months of 1947 would not sell in a market where the
buyer had much choice. But by the end of September 1948 accumulated
stocks of popular recordings were running low. While the recorders may
have had a sufficient supply of classical records to last indefinitely, such
records account for only 30 per cent of their total sales.3 2 And the non-
classical works from which most of their revenue comes are of such fleet-
ing popularity that a constant stream of replacements is necessary. As the
companies exhausted their stocks of tunes recorded in the last few months
of 1947 replacements were not forthcoming.
There had been some "bootleg" recording, of course, just as there was
last time, but it again was of little consequence. The companies imported
some matrices and records from other countries, but for the most part
the musicians of other countries showed little talent for the type of musical
interpretation which sells the most records in the United States. 3 6 More-
over, foreign record manufacturers may prefer to do their own exploiting
of what demand there is for their product in this country-Decca, Ltd. is
already distributing substantial numbers of its "London" records in the
United States through the London Gramaphone Company, a subsidiary
incorporated in New York in 1946.
The transcription companies were in little better position than the
recorders. They could continue to manufacture singing commercials either
without instrumental music or with instruments not regarded as musical
314 Broadcasting 14 (Mar. 22, 1948).
32s Taubman, op. cit. supra note 125, at 2o; Variety, p. 46 (Mar. I9, 1947).
326 During the first recording ban members of the English Musicians' Union refused to make
records for export to the United States. During the first eight months of the current ban the
English musicians not only made English records destined for United States markets, but
also made records for American companies with American vocalists visiting in England and
supplied American companies with recorded instrumental backgrounds for vocal recordings
made in this country. In August 1948, however, the English union instructed its members not
to provide any more instrumental music for American vocalists, although they continued
to make English recordings for American consumption. Variety, p. z (Sept. i, x948).
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by the AFM (ocarinas, ukeleles, etc.),327 and continued production of tai-
lor-made transcriptions seemed assured. But all library transcription pro-
duction was stopped and more than one use of new open-end transcrip-
tions made by AFM members was prevented by the recording ban. While
music for such transcriptions could be dubbed in from the existing supply
of recorded works, the transcription companies were in the same position
as the record manufacturers with respect to new tunes.
The Federation's staying power seemed stronger than that of the
companies, but not inexhaustible. The recording ban meant a reduction
in the earnings of some of its members. Although those affected consti-
tuted less than 3 per cent of the total membership,328 they were its most
successful members and their superior financial (they also paid the most
taxes to the union) and prestige positions made their attitude toward the
recording ban of utmost importance to its successful maintenance. While
they went along on the previous ban and there was no evidence that any
substantial number of them were yet disposed to violate this one, it was
not likely that they would be willing to give up their recording income
forever. But at least until NAPA succeeded in its attempt to empower
them to collect royalties on the commercial use of their records, they
would probably be satisfied with a plan of settlement which took the
phonograph record off the air and out of the juke box, since about 8o per
cent of the demand for records comes from home users.2 9
There were new legal remedies available to the companies which had
not been available during the last recording ban. The Taft-Hartley Act
makes it an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4)330 and the basis
for a damage suit under section 303331 for a union "to engage in ... a
strike or a concerted refusal... to perform any services, where an ob-
ject thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring ... any employer or other person
to cease using.., the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ......
This provision, stemming from the notion that the secondary boycott
37 When some of the recording companies used harmonicas to provide the accompaniment
for vocal recordings of post-19 47 hits, the AFM Executive Board took a new reading of the
By-Laws, ignored the competing jurisdictional claims of the American Guild of Variety
Artists (AFL) and announced that harmonica players were "performers on musical instru-
ments" and therefore eligible for AFM membership. International Musician 7 (May 1948).
38 Note 230 supra.
-"9 It is estimated that x per cent of all record production is purchased for radio use, 19 per
cent for juke boxes, and the balance for home use. Lunde, op. cit. supra note 282, at 46.
30 6x Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4) (Supp., 1947).
33x 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 187 (Supp., 1947).
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is an evil per se, is clearly designed to outlaw strikes "an object" of which
is to cause the struck employer to cease dealing with a third party, regard-
less of what the union is seeking to obtain from the third party. But it
does contemplate that the union be seeking to affect the third party in
some fashion-it does not outlaw strikes called only to secure a concession
from the employer against whom the strike is called.332 And its terms cer-
tainly do not apply to a concerted refusal to work wherein the union is
not even attempting to affect the conduct of the immediate employer.
The form of the Federation's announcement of the current recording
ban was undoubtedly designed with these qualifications in mind. The re-
fusal to work for the recording and transcription companies was not con-
ditioned on their ceasing to deal with the broadcasters and juke box oper-
ators. Nor was any other demand made on those companies.
But in his testimony before the Hartley Committee in January 1948
Petrillo suggested that Congress "make some kind of a law that the musi-
cians can make records for home consumption, and let the musicians and
the fellow who has commercialized records fight it out.... We favor re-
cordings if we can stop this commercialized business on recordings. ' ' 333 On
the basis of this testimony, some of the transcription companies filed un-
fair labor practice charges against the Federation, 334 but it was far from
clear that an unfair labor practice could be proved. Petrillo's testimony
articulated what was perfectly obvious anyway-that the AFM's objec-
tion was not to recorded music as such but to the use of recorded music
on the radio and in the juke box. That testimony did not establish, how-
ever, that the union either demanded or expected the recording ban to
compel the recording and transcription companies to cease supplying
their products to the broadcasters and to the operators of juke boxes and
wired music services. Obviously, the transcription companies could never
be induced to take such action, since broadcasters and wired music opera-
tors were their only customers. And the Federation recognized that there
apparently was no way the recording companies could prevent the broad-
casters and juke box operators from buying and using their records. 335
33 Thus, only by a strict regard for corporate entities could it be found that a strike against
RCA-Victor to compel it to cease supplying recorded music to NBC or a strike against Colum-
bia Records to compel it to cease rendering similar service to CBS was a strike for the purpose
of forcing RCA-Victor or Columbia "to cease doing business with any other person."
333 Hearings, op cit. supra note 91, at 340, 352.
334New York Times, p. 17 (May 14, 1948). The original complainants were Associated
Program Service, Inc., Lang-Worth Feature Programs, Inc., and Standard Radio Transcrip-
tion Service, Inc., none of which manufacture phonograph records. Associated Program Service
Inc., subsequently withdrew its charges. Variety, p. 45 (June 30, 1948).
335 Thus, Petrillo told the congressional committee that "the recording companies can't
say that this record is made for home consumption and that this one is made for commercial
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The most that Petrillo's testimony demonstrated was that the Federation
entertained some hope that by thus dramatizing the problem it might
induce Congress to take action to limit the commercial use of recorded
music-an objective which is hardly within the prohibition of the Taft-
Hartley Act.
The Lea Act also contains a provision aimed at recording bans. Sub-
section (b) (2) makes it unlawful to compel or attempt to compel a broad-
caster or any other person, by use or threat of the use of force, violence,
intimidation, duress or any other means "to accede to or impose any re-
striction upon ... production, preparation, manufacture, sale, purchase,
rental, operation, use or maintenance [of recordings or transcriptions] if
such restriction is for the purpose of preventing or limiting the use of
such [recordings or transcriptions] in broadcasting or in the production,
preparation, performance or presentation of a program or programs for
broadcasting." While this statute is not limited to the secondary boycott
situation,336 insofar as it proscribes union action taken to compel the pro-
ducers of records and transcriptions to "impose" restrictions upon their
production, it too requires some demand upon those producers. And if the
phrase "to accede to" also contemplates some sort of cooperative action
on the part of the producers, application of the Lea Act would present
the same problems of proof as were encountered under the Taft-Hartley
Act-magnified by the burden imposed on the prosecution in a criminal
case. But if "to accede to" includes mere recognition of fait accompli, then
the recording and transcription companies had certainly been compelled
to accede to a restriction upon their production.
It would still be necessary to prove, however, that the restriction was
for the purpose of preventing the use of records and transcriptions in
broadcasting, and there was no direct evidence of such purpose. Inferences
drawn from past conduct and from Petrillo's testimony337 might be urged
use. They can't separate the two, because of some court decision that says that the person
who buys the record has it as his property and he can do with that record as he pleases."
Hearings, op. cit. supra note 91, at 352.
36 It would, for instance, apply to the situation described in note 332 supra even though
corporate entities were disregarded.
3 Petrillo's testimony probably would not be available against him. R.S. § 859, as amend-
ed, 52 Stat. 943 (1938), 28 U.S.C.A. § 634 (Supp., 1947), provides that "No testimony given
by a witness... before any committee... of either House... shall be used as evidence in
any criminal proceeding against him in any court.. . ." Petrillo did not assert his privilege
against self-incrimination at any stage of the proceedings. But United States v. Monia, 317
U.S. 424 (1942), decided under another immunity statute which did not expressly require
claim of the privilege, held that such claim was not necessary. And since R.S. § 859 does not
limit the immunity to testimony given under subpoena, it should likewise be immaterial that
no subpoena was issued against Petrillo. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2282 (3 d ed., 1940); Cf.
Sherwin v. United States, 268 U.S. 369 (1925).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
to contradict the union's "declared intention," but the WAAF case337a
stood as a fresh reminder that in a criminal proceeding inferences may
not be enough.
Neither the Lea Act nor the Taft-Hartley Act was tested against the
1948 ban. On October 5, 1948 representatives of RCA-Yictor, Columbia,
Decca, Capitol, and three of the smaller record companies met with AFM
officials to discuss possibilities of settlement, and on October 28 it was
announced that they had agreed upon a plan formulated by attorney
Milton Diamond, who had represented Decca during the previous ban
but who was retained by the AFM for this one.
The "Diamond plan," which is to run for five years, provides for con-
tinuation of the royalty payments at substantially the same rates as were
applied under the previous royalty contract. The payments are to be
made to a trustee, who is appointed by the recording companies while
the Taft-Hartley Act is in effect but who is to be appointed by the AFM
as soon as the Act is repealed or "so revised as to permit such appoint-
ment." Royalty funds are to be expended by the trustee "on musical per-
formances where no admission fee is to be charged and without any profit
to the trust fund, in connection with patriotic, charitable, educational,
and similar programs." For this purpose the trustee is to distribute the
funds among the AFM Locals on a per capita basis and to supervise the
manner in which they are expended by the Locals. As a part of the agree-
ment the AFM waived its claim to royalties on records pressed between
January 1, 1948 and October 1, 1948 from matrices made under the old
royalty contracts.337b
This agreement did not become effective immediately-its operation
was conditioned upon assurance from the Department of justice that it
did not violate the prohibition of payments "to any representative of
... employees" contained in Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act. But
on December 13 the Department, departing from its usual practice,
issued an opinion advising the parties that the trustee was not a "repre-
sentative of employees" within the meaning of the Act, and AFM mem-
bers began recording for signatories to the agreement the following
day.337e The smaller recording and transcription companies will have no
choice but to join in this agreement.
Thus have the companies secured peace by joining in a plan to avoid
37a See Countryman, The Organized Musicians: I, 16 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 56, 82-84 (x948).
3111 Variety, P. 37 (Nov. 3, 1948); Broadcasting, p. 21 (Nov. 1, 1948); New York Times,
p. i (Dec. 14, 1948). The companies have designated Samuel Rosenbaum, a director of the
Philadelphia Orchestra Association, as first trustee under the plan.
33" New York Times, p. i (Dec. 14, 1948).
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the statutory prohibition which they had beseeched Congress to enact a
year earlier. And peace seems assured for five years-the AFM's record
for performance of its contracts is perfect. But it seems unlikely that the
royalty system constitutes a lasting solution to the problem. The limited
amount of employment which it provides falls far short of balancing the
unemployment which the Federation attributes to the use of recorded
music. The union may yet be driven by the force of its own arguments
to the position that it will no longer provide recorded music for com-
mercial use, and if the union takes that position the companies will doubt-
less make new- demands for effective legal sanctions. The difficulties in-
herent in the application of the Lea Act and the Taft-Hartley Act indi-
cate that legal sanctions, to be effective, may have to be made applicable
to union activity without the necessity of proving a specific purpose.
But any attempt to fashion a statute which would forbid the recording
ban regardless of its purpose would present an even more serious problem
under the Thirteenth Amendment than the one avoided in the WAAF
case. Although the question is still open, 338 that Amendment is not drawn
in terms which indicate that it imposes no limitation upon federal power.
It provides that involuntary servitude shall not exist "within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." Nor does the further
provision giving Congress power "to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation" suggest that Congress is to be left free also to adopt legislation
of opposite effect. True, even though a right to strike should be found in
this constitutional prohibition, it would not be unlikely that such right
would be held subject to some legislative restriction based upon the pur-
poses for which the strike was called, 339 and the provision of the Lea Act
involved the WAAF case might be sustained on that ground. But if the
Thirteenth Amendment is to have any operation other than as an enabling
ordinance for federation legislation prohibiting involuntary servitude cre-
ated by state or individual action,340 it must invalidate a federal statute
which would forbid an individual to quit his job. And if it limits the fed-
eral power to that extent, it can be reconciled with a federal statute pro-
scribing a concerted, unqualified refusal to work only by exhuming the
339 See The Reach of the Thirteenth Amendment, 47 Col. L. Rev. 299 (1947); The Lea
Act: An Enactment To Proscribe Certain Coercive Practices Affecting Broadcasting, 35
Geo. L. J. 79, 86-91 (1946).
339 It has been decided thata state does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing
criminal penalties upon a labor-union official who called a strike to enforce a stale wage claim of
a former employee of the struck employer. "Neither the common law, nor the Fourteenth
Amendment, confers the absolute right to strike." Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926).
340 See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944), and cases cited; Federal Power To Prosecute
Violence against Minority Groups, 57 Yale L.J. 85s, 864 (1948).
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legal abracadabra of civil and criminal "conspiracy" in labor cases from
a deserved repose.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that the interest of the public (i.e., those
of us who are not professional musicians and who have no financial inter-
est in broadcasting, recording, juke box, and wired music businesses) re-
quires governmental action of this sort. True, it would benefit the com-
panies involved if the government were to end recording bans by com-
pelling the musicians to return to their recording work. But recording
bans could also be ended, in a manner beneficial to the musicians rather
than to their opponents, if governmental power was exercised to compel
the broadcasters and the juke box and wired music operators either to
cease using recorded music or to use it only on terms agreeable to the
musicians. As the record now stands, it has not been demonstrated that
the public has more reason to have its government intervene on behalf of
the industries than on behalf of the musicians.
Disregarding charges and countercharges pitched at the emotional
level, the arguments which each side has presented to the various govern-
mental forums in which the problem has been aired have centered around
two main issues:
i) The Federation has offered but one justification for its recording
bans-the employment needs of the musicians. In support of that argu-
ment, it offers estimates that not more than one-third of its 2oo,ooo mem-
bers are able to find full-time employment in the musical field. The com-
panies, somewhat obliquely, treat these same estimates as evidence that
the Federation faces no unemployment problem. They refuse to accept
the total membership figure as any evidence of employment needs. They
take the somewhat novel (for an employer) position that the Federation
is too free with its memberships. Pointing to the low admission require-
ments, initiation fees, and dues, and to the fact that a member who finds
little musical employment pays little to maintain his membership, they
suggest that most of the AFM members are enrolled solely for the purpose
of sharing in the royalties from the recording contracts and in such other
benefits as the Locals may provide. They offer the results of certain spot-
checks which they have made in a few cities which show that only about
one-third of the union members in those cities classified themselves, either
in city directories or in response to direct inquiry, as musicians, and that
the remainder classified themselves in other vocations.347 The final thrust
34, These figures, if otherwise reliable, reveal only the number of union members who are
still primarily employed as musicians or who are still seeking such employment, and hence
afford no more basis for evaluating the AFM's claims than do the figures of the federal census
reported in note 123 supra.
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of their argument is that the 135,ooo AFM members not engaged as full-
time musicians are not competent musicians anyway.
This position is as untenable as the Federation's contention that every
member not working full-time at music is an unemployed musician for
whom musical work must be found. The true situation lies somewhere
between the claims of the disputants. There are undoubtedly a substantial
number of AFM members who are not capable of filling first-rate profes-
sional engagements: oldtimers who are no longer able to perform but who
have an interest in Local benefit plans, and others of limited attainments
who can expect no more than an occasional local engagement. But it can-
not be assumed that all of those members who now find regular but less
than full-time musical employment are not competent musicians. Nor
does it seem feasible to require a survey to determine the competence of
each AFM member. It will be time enough for the companies to assert
that all competent musicians are already employed when they can produce
evidence that the Federation is offering unqualified men to fill musical
engagements.
Certainly, on the basis of presently available information we are not
ready to conclude that all those who now seek unsuccessfully to make a
living as musicians should be forced to transfer their efforts to some other
vocation. Nor should we overlook the fact that some measure of opportu-
nity must be maintained if new talent is to be encouraged to enter the
field, and that a period of apprenticeship is necessary to segregate those
new entrants who have talent from those who have not. There is no evi-
dence that the demand for employable musicians has now reached the
point where the only available supply is the untalented by-product of
that segregative process.
2) The companies contend that the Federation's resistance to mechani-
cal competition is but one more instance of a labor union's selfish efforts
to deprive society of the benefits of technological progress. Such a conten-
tion is unassailable so long as "technological change" and "technological
progress" are assumed to be identical, but such an assumption will not
always bear analysis. Presumably, "progress" is embodied in technological
development if that development provides a better product than was pre-
viously available or provides the same product at a lower price. To test
the phonograph record and the transcription by that standard, it is nec-
essary to examine them in the context of the commercial practices which
the AFM opposes.
Does the phonograph record, in those instances where it has replaced
the live musician, supply a better musical product? It is true that by using
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phonograph records a radio station can in many instances bring to its lis-
teners the performances of better musicians than it can employ. But does
it follow that a program where such performances are used only to provide
an occasional three-minute interval in the vacuous monologue of a disc
jockey is preferable to a live program featuring less accomplished musical
performers? The answer to that question is not to be found by consulting
a poll which indicates that listeners may consider such a program prefer-
able to the soap opera or the audience-participation show.s 42 And even
those who would come to the defense of the disc jockey are not likely to
argue seriously that the strident blasting of the juke box is superior to the
performance of even the most modestly endowed live musician.
Does the phonograph record provide a cheaper source of musical enter-
tainment? Without question, the operator of the radio station can provide
a recorded musical program at substantially less cost than he can employ
a live orchestra. But do the listeners benefit by this saving? Clearly they
do not benefit as listeners-the cost of radio programs is not reflected in
the cost of receiving sets. If that benefit is to reach them at all, it must
be in their capacity as consumers of the sponsor's product and must pur-
sue a devious route through reductions in the cost of the program to the
sponsor and corresponding reductions in the cost of his product. No such
elaborate theory of derivative benefits is urged by the companies in sup-
port of their "technological progress" argument, and the only available
bit of evidence indicates that economies effected in the production of radio
programs are at least to a large extent absorbed at the source-during the
eight-year period from 1938 to 1945 the broadcasting industry increased
its ratio of net income to gross revenue from 17 per cent to 28 per cent.343
Of course, the benefit may reach the listener in another form. The avail-
ability of cheap recorded music permits the operation of small stations in
some localities where the cost of live performers would prove prohibitive.
To the extent that such stations provide their communities with local
service not available to them otherwise, the local benefit may be attribut-
ed to savings effected through the use of mechanical music. But the broad-
casters have been understandably reluctant to call attention to the local
service offered by such stations. When the FCC examined the programs
of 376 stations of 250 watts or less in 1945, it found that they devoted an
average of two hours and forty-three minutes per day to "local live" pro-
342 Local disc jockeys are reported to have higher local Hooper ratings than competing net-
work shows. Variety, p. 92 (Jan. 7, 1948). But no recorded show is included in the Hooper
listing of the top fifteen programs. Variety, p. 21 (Nov. 3, 1948).
343 FCC Blue Book 48; FCC, Thirteenth Annual Report i8 (1947). Gross revenues during
the same period increased i68 per cent.
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grams (including, in many cases, the performances of local disc jockeys
and of local announcers reading syndicated "wire" news), and that only
forty-four minutes of this time was during the best listening hours (6 to
ii P.m.) of the day. 344
Outside of the field of radio broadcasting, any traces of saving to the
purchasers of musical entertainment are even more difficult to detect.
Savings to the tavern keeper or night club operator who has replaced his
orchestra with the juke box are apparent-what was previously an invest-
ment in customer-attraction whose value was highly speculative has now
become a separate source of revenue. 4s But the customers who now pay
out an estimated $230,000,000 in nickels annually 34 to keep the juke
boxes operating can hardly count occasional instances of elimination of
cover charges or reduction in the cost of food and beverage as a clear gain.
A better case for "technological progress" can be made out for the
electrical transcription-if we eliminate the spot commercial, which could
be defended by none but its manufacturer and user.347 As recently listed
by the FCC,-18 the chief advantages of transcriptions which are relevant
to musical programs are:
r. They "make possible the compilation of a permanent archive of the best in radio."
2. They facilitate the placing of programs at convenient hours, despite differences in
time zones. 349
344 FCC Blue Book 38.
34 Under current trade practice the proprietor of the amusement place gives nothing but his
permission to have the juke box installed, for which he receives 5c per cent of the revenue, al-
though there is a move on among the owners of the machines to reduce his share to 25 per cent.
Hearings, op. cit. supra note 183, at 175-76.
346 Schumach, A Juke Box for Every 5oo Persons, New York Times Magazine 31 (Apr.
14, 1946); Hearings, op. cit. supra note 183, at I8. The juke box industry disputes this esti-
mate, but professes complete inability to supply a more accurate one. Ibid., at 98, io8, 140-41.
347 A poll recently conducted for the National Association of Broadcasters by the Univer-
sity of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center reveals that when forced to choose be-
tween "singing commercials" and "straight commercials," 43 per cent of those polled chose
the straight commercials, 37 per cent chose the singing variety, i8 per cent had no preference,
and 2 per cent were undecided. Unfortunately, the poll did not seek a separate reaction to
straight commercials against which these comparative figures might be measured, although it
did establish that only 20 per cent of those polled would be willing to pay a license fee of $5
per year to "get your present radio programs without any advertising in them." National
Opinion Research Center, Final Tabulations: 3529 Interviews of Second Study of Public
Opinion Conducted for the National Association of Broadcasters 5-6 (1948). A similar poll
conducted by the same Research Center in 1945 revealed that when asked to cite an example
of "the worst advertising you've heard on the radio," ii per cent cited a singing or rhyming
commercial. The same stout 20 per cent was willing to pay a $5 fee to get radio programs
without advertising. Lazarsfeld and Field, The People Look at Radio 111-12 (1946).
348 FCC Blue Book 36.
349 The FCC noted, however, that "some stations appear to use the transcription tech-
nique for shifting an outstanding network public service program from a good hour to an
off hour when listeners are few and commercial programs are not available.'!
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3. They make possible the sharing of programs among stations not affiliated with a
network.
4. They provide an opportunity to edit the performance before it is released over
the air.350
In each of these respects the electrical transcription is a factor con-
tributing to a better radio product, and one which the listening public has
a definite interest in retaining. But as long as a recording ban is not ap-
plied to transcriptions limited to one use per station it deprives the lis-
tener only of the first, and most dubious, of these advantages.
On such information as is now available, then, it appears that, apart
from some inconvenience to the private collector of popular records, which
is hardly a matter of national concern, recording bans cause hardship
to none but the recording companies, the broadcasters, and the juke box
operators, and that there is no apparent reason why the government
should intervene on their behalf rather than on behalf of the musicians.
Indeed, the musicians' economic interest in restricting the commercial use
of phonograph records seems to a large extent to coincide with the public
interest in better musical entertainment, so that if the government is to
intervene at all, that intervention might more properly be in a form which
would aid the musicians.
But governmental action to further the public interest in better musical
entertainment hardly seems likely in the immediate future. Although the
FCC's recent "Blue Book" pronouncement-3 has been both hailed and
denounced as the opening wedge in a scheme of widespread governmental
supervision of radio program content, the policy which it announces is
aimed only at securing a reasonable allocation of broadcasting time to
sustaining programs, local programs, and discussions of public issues, and
at eliminating advertising excesses. Extensive use of recorded music is
denounced only to the extent that it conflicts with that'policy. And while
attempts of the Commission to enforce its Blue Book policy may lead
eventually to decisions indicating that it has authority under the Com-
munications Act of 1934 to go even further to require the broadcasters
to serve "public interest, convenience and necessity, '35 2 there are no in-
3so An even better opportunity for editing is presented by the tape recording, now used
by ABC in the preparation of the Bing Crosby program and by NBC and CBS for their day-
light saving time delayed broadcasts. Variety, p. i (Oct. i, 1947); ibid., p. 4o (Mar. 24, 1948);
Newsweek 31 (May 3, 1948).
39 Note 245 supra.
3s2 The only decision yet rendered in review of FCC action under the Blue Book policy
holds no more than that the Commission could find that public interest, convenience, and
necessity would not be served by granting an application for power increase and frequency
change filed by a licensee who planned to plug into the CBS network from 8 A.M. to II P.M.
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dications that either the Commission or the Congress is yet approaching
the point Secretary Hoover had reached in 1922.
As long, then, as we are content to leave program standards to the dic-
tates of the market place, we should count as a fortuitous benefit the de-
mands of a labor union which may serve to improve those standards.
It is not likely, however, that any such view of recording bans will pre-
vail. The broadcasting and recording companies have a different view to
present, and they may doubtless count on the same full cooperation from
most of the newspapers as they have received in the past. Labor unions
are always fair game for the press, which can make a national issue of a
strike by New York City elevator operators but can find no occasion for
comment in the refusal of industry to do anything about defense produc-
tion on the eve of world war until commitments are obtained on terms of
payment, profits, taxes, etc. Nor is it irrelevant, in the context of the
recording controversy, that one-third of the broadcasting industry is
owned by newspaper interestsS3s and that newspapers and broadcasters
depend on the same advertisers for their revenue.
The pattern of this cooperative effort during the first recording ban of-
fers a reliable indication of what may be expected. Before the ban took
effect, the National Association of Broadcasters had set up a public
relations office in New York, had "brought the facts in this matter to the
attention of the newspapers and of other interested groups," had con-
tacted the advertisers and learned that "they are prepared to stand
loyally with the broadcasting industry," and was able to announce that
the initial reaction to its public relations campaign was "favorable" and
that "a large number of newspaper editorials on the matter have been
printed uniformly denouncing Mr. Petrillo's course of action.1354 In suc-
ceeding weeks it was able to point with pride to an "unprecedented"
number of such editorials in newspapers throughout the country, from the
New York Times to the Wyoming Eagle, all of which denounced the AFM,
and few of which discussed the matter in anything but the inflammable in-
vective of "dictatorship." After a month of this emotional haranguing, a
resolution was introduced in the Senate to authorize the first congression-
al investigation of the AFM,3s5 and Dr. Gallup reported that public reac-
every day, saving only the hours from 5 A.M. to 8 A.M. for local programs. Simmons v. FCC,
169 F. 2d 670 (App. D.C., 1948).
3s, Newspapers hold more than one-third of all AM licenses, constitute more than one-third
of all newcomers to FM, and are the largest single group of applicants for television licenses.
Variety, p. i (Jan. 29, 1947).
3S4 NAB, Special A.F. of M. Bulletin x (July 24, 1942).
U See note x73 supra.
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tion to "Mr. Petrillo's ruling" was 75 per cent unfavorable and that 73
per cent of those polled approved of "the government taking legal action
to stop Petrillo."' &6
When editorial fury began to subside, the NAB provided new impetus
and new ammunition in the form of a pamphlet entitled "The C Is For
Caesar" which rang the changes on the "technological progress" theme
and pictured the plight of the small broadcasting station attempting to
present a performance of the "Unfinished Symphony" with"two or three
or even six local musicians of uncertain attainment."53s When some of the
companies withdrew from the controversy and signed royalty contracts,
the NAB found solace in editorial condolences and drew strength from
editorial tributes to those with the courage to continue the fight against
tyranny.35 When the AFM refused to comply with the WLB order and
the President's request, newspaper comment reached a final despairing
crescendo, decrying government's abdication to "irresponsible private
dictatorship."59
The earlier ending of the second recording ban foreclosed resort to the
same tactics this time, but all preparatory steps had been taken. A
Special Industry Music Committee, consisting of representatives of the
National Association of Broadcasters, the Frequency Modulation Associa-
tion, the Television Broadcasters Association, the transcription com-
panies, and the record manufacturers, was created in October 1947,360 and
the Committee retained public relations counsel.36' Another congres-
sional investigation of the AFM was conducted by the Hartley Com-
mittee in January 1948.362 Some delay in the publicity campaign was neces-
356 NAB, Special A.F. of M. Bulletin s (Sept. 4, 1942).
3s7 Ibid., No. 9 (Oct. 2, 1942). 3s$ Ibid., No. 23 (Oct. 29, 1942).
359 Ibid., No. 29 (Nov. 24, x944). In its entire three-year history, the War Labor Board's
orders were disregarded 27 times by unions and 24 times by employers. 17 Lab. Rel. Rep. 6o5
(I946). But the amount of publicity given the AFM case was rivaled in only one other in-
stance, wherein publicity of a different sort resulted in a congressional investigation of the
government's power to take over a business for noncompliance with WLB orders. Hearings
before Select Committee To Investigate Seizure of Montgomery Ward & Co. pursuant to
H. Res. 521, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. (1944).
360 NAB Reports 88o (Oct. 29, 1947). 36x Variety, p. 21 (Dec. 31, 1947).
36 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 91. At these hearings industry spokesmen suggested addi-
tional legislation to outlaw nation-wide collective bargaining and to subject union activity
to the anti-trust laws. Ibid., at 58, 228, 235. Shortly thereafter Representative Hartley oblig-
ingly introduced H.R. 6074, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess. (1948), which would have made the Norris-
LaGuardia and Clayton Acts inapplicable to "any strike or other concerted interference with
the operations of two or more employers which results from any conspiracy, collusion or con-
certed plan of acting between employees of such two or more employers" or wherever labor
unions engage in "any combination or conspiracy, in restraint of commerce, if one of the
purposes or a necessary effect ... is to join or combine with any person to... restrict pro-
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sary because negotiations on new network contracts were pending when the
recording ban went into effect-6 3 and because of the recording companies'
interest in avoiding any termination of the ban until existing record stocks
were sold.164 But if the ban had not ended before those stocks were ex-
hausted, the press would undoubtedly have again discovered large moral
issues in the controversy.36 s
CONCLUSION
In any evaluation of the American Federation of Musicians, the "dic-
tatorship" issue may be put to one side. In its internal operations the
Federation is no less democratic than most other organizations of com-
parable size. True, its members, like the members of most labor unions
and the stockholders of most large corporations, are disposed to perpetu-
ate the same men in office366 and to leave the making of most policy de-
cisions to the discretion of the officers. But, save for the attempt to
disfranchise the members of New York Local 802, which failed twelve
years ago, there is no evidence of irresponsibility on the part of AFM
officers. As the employer member of the WLB panel said in I944, "Mr.
James C. Petrillo, while certainly in charge of his union, is certainly no
more so than the head of every well-run corporation is of his company.Y367
Actually, when the employers raise the "dictatorship" charge, they do
not attempt to support it by evidence of the manner in which the union
is governed, save for an occasional reference to the provision in the AFM
By-Laws authorizing the President to set aside existing laws and sub-
duction, distribution, or competition, or impose restrictions or conditions upon the purchase,
sale, or use of any product, material, machines, or equipment.. .. "
363 Final agreement between the AFM and the networks on a pay scale for television was
reached on April 29, 1948. On the same day the Special Industry Music Committee announced
that it had retained a new public relations counsel, who is reported as having explained that
"a major part of his job will be to get across to the public the fact that the AFM's recent settle-
ment of radio and television contracts has not entirely ended the Petrillo problem." Broad-
casting 30 (May 3, 1948).
364 The latter consideration was apparently overlooked by baffled Congressmen who sought
in vain for some explanation from the recording companies for their failure to invoke the anti-
boycott provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act last January. Hearings, op. cit. supra note 91, at
102-3, 202-3.
365 The AFM, which has had no faith in publicity as a weapon since the failure of its cam-
paign against sound movies, had apparently decided to give it another try. It had employed
public relations counsel, and its version of the recording ban was sent to schools, libraries,
and newspapers throughout the country. Variety, p. 45 (May ig, 1948).
36 Leadership of the AFM during its fifty-two-year history has been divided between three
men. Owen Miller, president of the St. Louis Local, served also as the first president of the
AFM. He was replaced in i9oo by Joseph N. Weber who, save for a one-year retirement be-
cause of illness in 1914-I5 when his place was taken by Frank Carothers, served until suc-
ceeded by Petrillo in i94o.
367 Electrical Transcription Manufacturers, i6 War Lab. Rep. 369, 396 (1944).
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stitute others of his own making. Instead, they point to the fact that
Petrillo habitually serves the union's demands in the form of peremptory
decrees which leave the employers no alternative but to acquiesce,368 seek-
ing to leave the impression that they have nearly always, under duress
to be sure, acquiesced. But the record of past bargaining history hardly
supports that position. 369 It suggests, rather, that in those cases where
AFM leaders have been most arbitrary in their dealings with the com-
panies, as in the instances of the bans on co-op, FM, and television broad-
casting, their action stems from their complete inability to determine
what sort of demands to make, and that this inability has ultimately
operated to the advantage of the companies. 370
Aside from the fact that its practice of calling musicians out of the
studios without having formulated any policy to be served thereby has
resulted only in depriving AFM members of years of employment in
television and FM broadcasting and on co-op shows, the most serious com-
plaint which can be made against the Federation leadership goes to the
extremely myopic nature of some of the policies it has adopted. The most
indefensible of its practices are those which have brought the least benefit
to the membership. The complete elimination of all public performances
by amateur musicians throughout the United States would probably not
create enough additional work for professionals to support fifty AFM
members-but to the pursuit of this trivial objective must be credited,
in large part, the congressional indignation which found expression in the
Lea Act. And though the union's quota rules and standby practices may
have provided immediate relief for a greater number of musicians, such
368 The form of the demand for standbys on duplicate AM-FM broadcasts is typical: "This
is to advise you that after meeting between your company and the AFM held in my office, the
matter was further discussed and we came to the final conclusion that beginning Monday,
October 29, 1945, wherever musicians play for FM broadcasting and AM broadcasting
simultaneously,... a double crew must be employed. Kindly govern yourself accordingly."
Hearings, op. cit. supra note 9i, at 68.
369 Nor does the testimony of NAB President Justin Miller:
"MR. MILLER: ... As I say, the trouble is the dramatic, the ultimatum technique...
which he [Petrillo] prefers to use. Frankly, I think it is because it impresses his own large spread
membership.
"MR. McCoNNEL: In the past, have you usually given in to Mr. Petrillo?
"MR. MILLER: I should say it has been a matter of bargaining. There has been a com-
promise. There has always been some giving in, yes. You can see that from the rate of wages,
I imagine.
"There probably has been too much giving in. Is that what you want me to say? I will be
glad to say it. Personally, I think there has been too much giving in." Hearings, op. cit.
supra note gi, at 18.
370 Other unions in the broadcasting industry were outraged at the AFM's 1948 "Munich
agreements" with the networks, wherein the Federation capitulated to all employer demands
without getting anything in return. Variety, p. 27 (Mar. 24, 1948).
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devices offer no lasting solution to unemployment. As private systems of
social security, their method of distributing the cost is much too hap-
hazard and unreliable to warrant approval. They have already con-
tributed much to the enactment of restrictive labor legislation, and if that
legislation proves inadequate to end those practices it is quite probable
that Congress will try again.
On the matter which has provoked the most criticism and the greatest
amount of adverse governmental activity, however, the Federation's posi-
tion is quite defensible. The machine constitutes a real and growing threat
to the future of the musical profession. Yet, while the future of that pro-
fession should be a matter of public concern, the only steps currently being
taken in its behalf are those taken by the musicians themselves371 within
the restricted area left open to them under existing legislation. True, the
AFM's method of dealing with the problem may not be the best method
which could be devised. The public interest in radio service and in musical
entertainment might be better served if the musicians were required to
make library and open-end transcriptions and to keep smaller radio
stations and home phonographs supplied with records of the latest tunes.
But, aside from the improbability of government intervention being
limited to that extent, the case presents another factor in which the public
has some interest. Although it is not yet clear as a matter of established
legal doctrine, the personal liberties which are supposed to constitute an
essential ingredient of our society should include freedom from compulsory
service. And though those liberties may be subject to some abridgment
when their exercise threatens the existence of that society, nothing like a
"clear and present danger" to its existence is presented by the musicians'
refusal to serve the recording companies. If future recording controversies
prompt governmental action which fails to recognize that fact, the broad-
casting and recording industries may count as well spent their investment
in "public relations."
37, The musicians and other artists have had occasional champions in Congress. Florida's
Senator Fletcher kept bills to create a "National Conservatory of Music and Art" in the
hopper for six years. S. 4874, 65th Cong. 2d Sess. (igi8); S. 56I, 66th Cong. 1st Sess. (i919);
S. 622, 67th Cong. ist Sess. (1921); S. 8o8 and S. 132o, 68th Cong. ist Sess. (1924). Repre-
sentative Connery of Massachusetts once introduced a bill to create a "Commission for the
Advancement of Music and Art." H.R. 7161, 74 th Cong. ist Sess. (1935). And New York's
Representative Sirovich for five years sponsored measures to create a cabinet "Department
of Science, Art and Literature" or a "Bureau of Fine Arts" in the Department of Interior.
H.J. Res. 200, 7 4 th Cong. ist Sess. (935); H.J. Res. 79, 75 th Cong. ist Sess. (1937); H.J.
Res. 671, 7 5 th Cong. 3d Sess. (1938); H.J. Res. i49, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. (1939).
